The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy

Registered at the G.P.O., Sydney, for transmission by post as a periodical.

VOL. IX. SEPTEMBER, 1931. No. 3.

SIDELIGHTS.

III.—The Simple Life.

By EMERITUS PROFESSOR FRANCIS ANDERSON, M.A., LL.D.

THE Simple Life, like the Kingdom of Heaven, is within us. This is the conclusion of the whole matter, and it is sometimes well to state the conclusion first. We may wallow in misunderstandings from the beginning unless the ground is cleared from false issues. The simple life, both for the individual and society, is something to be achieved, to be won, often at a great cost, and as the last stage in a process. The longing to return to a primitive golden age is like the wish to become a child again. Both arise from the same illusion—that life and history are reversible. If happiness, like suffering, is an individual thing, it is as impossible to write a prescription for the simple life as it would be to find a recipe for making society happy. The Communist State professes to provide for everything except freedom, and without freedom the individual may become a trained rat or a performing poodle, but ceases to be man. Aristotle, criticising Plato's happy ideal State, said that it was absurd to speak of a happy State if the citizens were not happy. The values which constitute a happy life are not manufactured or provided *for* us. We gradually discover them and their claims upon us. This means a working upwards, for they are revealed to us from above, not from beneath. "What is he but a brute, whose flesh has soul to suit?" In this article I shall confine myself to the consideration of the Simple Life as an individual possession or possibility, without reference to the special problems arising from the nature of modern "industrialized" or "capitalistic" society, with its large scale production and standardized forms of life. Those problems must be left for later treatment.

The call to lead a simple life has been heard in all ages, especially in times of gross material prosperity, wasteful and excessive luxury, over-refinement of pleasures and callous disregard of truth, honour, beauty, and social and political justice. "Hear the word of the Lord, for the Lord hath a controversy with the inhabitants of the land, because there is no truth nor mercy, nor knowledge of God in the land. There is nought but

pp. 161-240 reprinted by Kraus Reprint Ltd.

swearing and breaking faith, and killing, and stealing, and committing adultery. . . My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge." The prophets of later ages continue to denounce in the good old style, but it is doubtful whether denunciation in any age has had an effect proportionate to the energies expended in denouncing. Steam has been blown off, but steam is not productive when it is blown off. Besides the denouncers, the proclaimers of judgment, the blowers off of steam, there are those who claim that they have something positive to say, and who call to a weak, wearied, perverse or corrupt generation—Ye have erred and strayed! Here is the way, walk ye in it! Their voices are many and varied, from Omar Khayyam and Ecclesiastes, to Rousseau, Tolstoi and Edward Carpenter, sometimes over loud and shrill, sometimes in tones of sweet reasonableness, pleading for a simpler, saner life. If all their pieces of good advice were brought together, each positive precept could be matched by its contrary, presented by someone else. They are so busy with their own limited, when not false, conceptions of life, of morals and religion, that they obscure the shining of the true ideals, which in their nature are eternal and unchangeable. And they are rarely free from the common vice of most reformers, who to save souls or to reform life advise men to throw away the things that make life worth living, *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*. When we put aside the faddists, to whom most things are to be rejected because of their being too expensive, or unwholesome, or wrong, the various solutions of the problem of what constitutes the simple life may be arranged under two main generalisations.

The first and simplest answer is to the effect that the simple life consists in *doing without things*.[1] The curse of civilisation is its over complexity, the over-abundance of objects which are deemed desirable or necessary. We carry too much gear, are burdened by too many impedimenta in our life's march. Life is overcrowded with objects which become enslaving interests. Our houses are congested with the accumulation of years, old clothes, old iron, ugly and useless rubbish of all sorts. A home becomes a prison where a woman lives, chained to her furniture and belongings. Three-fourths of life consists of things we could very well do without. Simplify! Simplify!

It is impossible not to sympathise with much of this advice. There are, no doubt, many things which one could

[1] "We live in a time of new theories of poetry, of painting, new theories of morals, education, diet, cookery, clothing; theories how to live without hats, or without boots, or without washing, or without self-denial or without work." (Gilbert Murray: "Essays and Addresses".)

very well do without, but very often the gospel of doing without things, means the finding fault with our neighbours' food and raiment and manner of living, irrespective of differences which may be essential and decisive. We want others to do without the objects in which we take no pleasure ourselves, which arouse no desires or represent no significant ideals existing within us. That may be a popular principle of discrimination, but it is hardly an adequate guide. An object which to one man is useless or meaningless, may be to another a priceless possession, a thing of beauty, a joy for ever. Money is what it buys, and those whose lives have been poor and meagre cannot understand why others need so many objects of sensuous or spiritual satisfaction. An English labour leader once declared in public that no man on God's earth was worth more than £600 a year. He meant, I suppose, that the desires which could not be satisfied, or the objects which could not be provided under that figure, were wrong desires and useless objects. Years afterwards he enjoyed as Cabinet Minister an income of several thousand pounds a year. He and his desires had grown during the interval, and his conception of the necessities of the simple life had changed, probably intensively as well as extensively. What we are, depends to a greater extent than we imagine, on what we have, but we *are* more than we *have*. The question always is, not the quantity of the objects we possess, but the relation in which we stand to the objects. In what sense are they ours, our property, our ministers and servants? Do they belong to us, or do we belong to them? Am I the master of the revels or only the baggage mule? In other words, simplifying life is not an arithmetical problem at all, to be solved by mere reduction or subtraction. Even in a palace, said Marcus Aurelius, life may be lived well, and even in a palace, it may be possible to live the simple life. In any case, if the problem is in one aspect a quantitative one, each man has to work out the sum for himself. But in our judgments on others we introduce the personal factor into the equation, and then there is a subtle change in the problem. We proceed to pass judgment on the quality rather than on the quantity of the objects or interests, and that implies a standard of living and a scale of the soul's desires, in fact a whole philosophy of life, unless we adopt the lowest common measure as the standard, the vicious assumption of a vulgarized democracy that what is good for one must necessarily be good for all. The saint and the gross liver, although at opposite spiritual poles, are sometimes curiously alike in the self-sufficiency of their attitudes to what conflicts with their habitual standards. Bishop Westcott once returned from a State Concert in a

state of agitation. "It was horrible, horrible. I cannot find any place for it at all in my scheme of life." Arthur Benson, who tells the story, adds the comment that it shows an absence of real simplicity to be thus at the mercy of externals. As for the facile judgments of the "man in the street", to whom the journalist appeals in time of trouble, that Solomon may be trusted to reject and condemn the objects and pursuits which he himself does not appreciate, and cannot enjoy. The American apostle of the Simple Life, Thoreau, dismissed from his consideration, the great majority of the objects which his neighbours regarded as necessities of a decent and orderly life. Such objects were not worth the trouble they cost, either to earn them or to keep them. "A lady once offered me a mat, but as I had no room to spare within the house, nor time to spare within or without to shake it, I declined it, preferring to wipe my feet on the sod before the door. It is best to avoid the beginnings of evil." Here we find a repetition of the ancient Cynic note—Property is the *beginning of evil.* Thoreau, in his hermit's hut, had reduced all ornament to a little vase on the mantelpiece, but finding that it cost him too much trouble to dust every day, he finally threw it away. It went to the rubbish heap of "things he could do without". Robespierre detested the handkerchief, and wrote a poem against its use, as a sign of decadent civilization, when Nature had given man ten fingers for the service. The old Greek cynic, Diogenes, had, in the same spirit, reduced all his crockery to an earthenware drinking cup, which he carried about with him. But seeing one day a boy drinking water from his hollowed hand, he threw his cup away. Objects are impedimenta—the fewer we have the better—that is the cynic attitude, the false anti-social attitude to life. For there are objects animate as well as inanimate, and men and women, the society of our fellows, may be numbered among the "things we can do without". I quote again from Thoreau: "Do not trouble yourself much to get new things, whether clothes or friends. God will see that you do not want society. If I were confined to a garret all my days, like a spider, the world would be just as large to me while I had my thoughts about me." While he had his thoughts about him—perhaps, though I doubt it. But where did he get his thoughts? Thoreau retired to his forest hut, as the man of the world in medieval times retired to the monastery, with the large mind, the far-reaching thoughts which he had won by previous intercourse with men and things in the world. A philosopher may shut himself up with his philosophy, but he did not acquire his philosophy by shutting himself up. He may be able to say, My mind to me

a kingdom is, but it became a kingdom, not by narrowing, but by expansion. Mind, like love, has to go out of self, to find itself in objects, in other selves. Shut up in self, it becomes narrow, hard, unseeing, unfeeling, and finally dies from lack of sustenance. The cynic, the solitary, the ascetic really seek to enrich life by impoverishing it, when they seek simplicity by a process of quantitative reduction. For objects are as necessary to the life of the self as body is to soul. The nature of self, of mind, is self-activity. It cannot be anything else, if it is to live, and the self seeks objects as the necessary means of satisfying, realizing self. Property is not an evil or an accident. It is the other side of self. Self is made real and objective in and through property. Only let us be sure that it really is property, that we really possess it, that it is ours for use or enjoyment. A new possession may be merely another worry and encumbrance, or it may reveal to us the entrance into a larger world, by calling forth a new activity, a power which had lain dormant within us. We did not know what literature really was, or what art really was, or what our own powers were, of enjoyment or creation, until the revelation came through the new experience following on the new possession. In calling forth new activities, objects enlarge the self, for the self is nothing apart from its activities. If what we want is to avoid trouble, then the task of simplification is easily accomplished. It is not difficult to turn one's back on civilization, and reject the decencies as well as the luxuries of life. The simple life has many counterfeits. We do not show ourselves superior to objects or conventions merely by rejecting them, nor is neglect of the body a sign of devotion to the things of the spirit. There are lazy men and silly women to whom the simple life is a gospel of dowdiness and dirt. Let us pray, said the preacher, not for easy lives, but to be stronger men, not for tasks nicely adjusted to our powers, but for powers equal to our tasks. Then we shall not need to look for miracles, for we ourselves shall be the miracle.

We may take it then that the simple life is not a mere gospel of "doing without". Life is being and becoming, not merely having or not having. And it is not a question of having more or having less. The ancient cynic, the medieval ascetic, the miser and the millionaire all in their different ways, confuse the wish to *have* with the wish to *become*. And each has his reward according to his nature and the fashion of his desires. There is one superstition that the more money one spends the more pleasure one will get; there is another superstition that the more money one accumulates, the happier one will be, irrespective of other ends and activities of the soul.

In both cases the moral nature may be consumed as in a furnace until it comes to ashes. On the other hand to "reject" objects may be equally suicidal. To adopt the oriental gospel of negation is a blasphemy on life, and a sin against one's own soul if it makes one indifferent to the rich warm-blooded ideal of a truly human life. Madame de Sévigné tells us that she always returned from Paris to her country home "hungry for fasting and silence", but a temporary refuge need not be made a permanent abode. A permanent "retreat" for the soul may end in a permanent vacuity of the spiritual life, unless one is touched by the same spirit as Wordsworth, of whom Coleridge said that "his soul seemed to inhabit the universe like a palace". The wish to *be* is the wish to *become,* and to be or become we must *have.* It seems to each of us a law of nature that our desires should be satisfied, yet it seems true also that to each is given only what he is fit to enjoy. To wish to become is rational and normal when it is one with the desire to become fit to enjoy, to prepare ourselves for the rich banquet of life. And objects and persons are necessary to satisfy the wish to be or become. Without them spiritual life would neither begin nor develop. Without them human life would be a stagnant pool. Objects are mirrors in which we see ourselves. They provide the stepping-stones and ladders by which we progress. They serve as whips and spurs that stimulate us to action. The more we try to do without objects (in the false sense we have been discussing) the less need the world has of us, and the better it can do without us.

There is, however, a second answer to the question of what constitutes the simple life, an answer which goes closer to the heart of the problem, but which is also misleading, often false and pernicious. We are told that the problem is one which is concerned not so much with *objects* as with *desires.* As the anonymous Sage has put it, if you wish to increase a man's happiness, seek not to increase his possessions, but to decrease his desires. Simplify your life means—Simplify your desires. Cleanthes, when asked what is the best way to be rich, replied, "To be poor in desires". This answer, however, is not, on analysis, very different from the first. The difference consists mainly in the verbal expression and point of view. For, in the first place, we cannot separate, in the art of living, desires from the objects which satisfy them, since the desires are cravings for objects; and, in the second place, this answer also interprets simplification in the quantitative sense—simplification is reduction. You cannot be or become without having objects and desires, but the solution of the problem of life is to be found in having few instead of many. Ecclesiastes,

thinking of a God ever on the look-out for broken oaths, said—let your words be few. The preacher of the simple life would say—let your desires be few, and, he might add, well chosen.

This, however, means discrimination, and discrimination implies a principle of discrimination. Upon what principle are we to choose between objects or between desires? For what reason are we to reject some desires and gratify others? The Buddhist ascetic condemned all desires. Desire was evil, and the path of simplification was to be followed to the logical conclusion, the eradication of every desire, even the desire to live. It is obvious that if simplification be taken in the quantitative sense, it supplies no principle of selection, and in the end, instead of life we have death. The medieval ascetic thought that he had a principle of selection when he spoke of the "vile body". Flesh was evil—spirit was divine. Crush the flesh and the lusts thereof! But asceticism in all its forms, except as a temporary discipline, or hygiene of the soul, comes to pretty much the same conclusion. When the Magyar heathen were about to kill St. Gellert of Hungary, he thanked them that "at last he was going to get rid of his body, the vile body that his spirit had dragged through life". Similarly, St. Philip Neri's recipe for happiness was found in three principles of life: first, to despise the world, secondly to despise oneself, and lastly, to despise being despised" (Reich's Plato, pages 209, 224). The Christian law of self-sacrifice should not be ignored or condemned because of its multifarious parodies and exaggerations. Other-worldiness is not the same as unworldliness. Selflessness is an impossible ideal for beings breathing thoughtful breath, since it destroys the possibility of unselfishness. "To conclude ascetically", says Robert Louis Stevenson, "is to give up and not to solve the problem. The ascetic and the creeping hog, although they are at opposite poles, have equally failed in life." To aim at negation for its own sake is ultimately as futile as to aim at gratification for its own sake.

But, it may be argued, without being one-sided devotees of the flesh or of the spirit, we still may make a selection among our desires. They are not all good, nor are they all bad. This, however, is the half-way house of unclear thinking. We speak of evil desires when what we really mean is bad habits. The desire for drink is a natural healthy desire; drunkenness is a bad habit. Every desire may become evil in its gratification, but there is no desire which is evil in itself, for the simple reason that no desire exists by itself in the normal life of a sane man. Let us cease to think of the desires and passions as separately existing things, which can be shed from us as so many garments. They exist not as juxtaposed

wheels in a machine, but as correlated functions of an organic life. The soul is one even when it is divided against itself, and the desires and passions are the way in which the soul lives. Out of its desires and passions the soul can make for itself either a heaven or a hell. Thoreau, in spite of his extravagances, had the root of the matter in him. "All sensuality is one, although it takes many forms." "The impure can neither stand nor sit with purity." Carlyle, speaking of a dishonest carpenter, said that he broke the whole decalogue with every blow of his hammer. To the vile all things are vile. The man whoses heart is evil will set foul words to the melodies of angels. On the other hand may we not likewise say that though there be many virtues, yet virtue is one. If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. When we speak of being saved from this or cured of that, we should remember that the maladies of the soul are due mainly to disorganization of the desires and passions, and that the causes of their diversion into wrong channels are generally to be found in our own selfishness, laziness and dislike of work. Hear one of Robert Louis Stevenson's fables—A man met a lad weeping. "What do you weep for?" he asked. "I am weeping for my sins", said the boy. "You must have little to do", said the man. The next day they met again. Once more the lad was weeping. "Why do you weep now?" asked the man. "I am weeping because I have no bread", said the lad. "I thought it would come to that", said the man. The moral is, if we want a moral, that "we are not damned for doing wrong, but for not doing right". Stevenson in another place tells us that the first command to man is that he should be thoroughly alive, and his revolt from his native Puritanism led him to declare in what for him is a somewhat rhetorical passage—"The demand of the soul is that we shall not pursue broken ends, but great and comprehensive purposes in which soul and body may unite like notes in a harmonious chord. The soul demands unity of purpose, not the dismemberment of man. It seeks to roll up all his strength and sweetness, all his passion and wisdom, into one, and makes him a perfect man, exulting in perfection." The preaching of Puritanism will never become obsolete. It is needed more than ever in a time like ours, when society is threatened not only with disorganization, but also with moral degeneration. Puritanism supplies iron to strengthen the blood of a decadent social organism. The defect of historical Puritanism was that it set a mark of condemnation on whole provinces of healthy human interest. Desires which are treasures of the soul and multiply its riches were treated with disrespect and even contumely. A

great artist tells us how he suffered because he could not rid himself of the thought that his whole-souled enjoyment of his art was evil. An inhuman doctrine of negation leads to distortion of character and spiritual mutilation, but none the less the way to life may often be through what seems death, and he who would save his life must lose it. Each man's life is full of tension and conflict. He himself must determine how the discord is to be resolved into harmony, and victory won at the cost of surrender or sacrifice. Not a day passes which is free from the eternal issues of right and wrong. He may be in doubt as to the number of the commandments, and often in sore trouble when plain duties seem to come into conflict with each other, but behind and above all particular commands and duties, there shine forth the eternal principles guiding human conduct, through which alone a man can save his soul alive. Hate slays and destroys. Lust burns and blasts. Love restores and heals.

In regard to others, each of us has to determine whether the gratification of our desires or the attainment of our ends means in a given case hurt or damage to other human beings, their material loss or moral degradation. In regard to our own personal development, each of us has to decide when one satisfaction has to be surrendered in order to realize another, and which satisfaction is to rank higher in the scale from the point of view of our permanent well-being. Will the present sacrifice stunt our future growth, or lead to the rounding and recreating of the whole man? Will it mean mutilation or only pruning? Lombardo Radice, the Italian Director of Education, had the courage to say "I believe in the creative capacity of every child. Every child is a poet, an artist, a sculptor, a singer, a botanist, a theologian, a philosopher, what you will, *after the fashion of a child.*" With our pedantic and stereotyped systems of education, and the multifarious conventions, repressions of family and social life, we do our best to stifle the growth of these undeveloped activities. In most cases perhops, no great harm is done, but often the individual, come to maturity, and conscious of what he has missed or sacrificed through false notions of life and duty, may feel as Rossetti felt with regard to the "Lost Days of his Soul":

> I do not see them here; but after death,
> God knows, I know the faces I shall see,
> Each one a murdered self, with low lost breath,
> "I am thyself, what hast thou done to me?"
> "And I—and I—thyself (lo, each one saith),
> And thou thyself to all eternity."

It is futile to attempt to describe or define *the* simple life. The simple life may be the best life, but the best life for you or for me may not be the simplest life or the one which costs the

least expenditure in time or trouble or even money. "It takes an expensive education to be able to admire a sunset", as the great artist admired it. If by the simple life we mean doing without ordinary objects of desire, then to have that life one must stand exceptionally high or exceptionally low in the spiritual scale. He who stands very low in the scale, can do without many objects, because he knows no better. He who stands very high in the spiritual scale, can also do without many objects, because he does know better. Walter Bagehot said that if a man had a mind of his own to play with, he could do without a great many other amusements. But that is because his mind is full of rare and wonderful things, infinite riches in a little room. The preachers of the simple life are generally ineffective because they think simplicity in negatives, as absence of complexity, absence of variety. They recommend a life in conditions which would tend to sterilize rather than fertilize the minds and hearts of most people. The simple life in such conditions, said one who had tried it, "is madness, except it is to break pleasant habits so as to return to them with a better appetite. My simple life in the country forces me about every three weeks to go to London, with no other object than to eat, without the least desire to see pictures, statues or fine buildings" (Davies: "True Traveller"). Life's ideal is not one of monotonous uniformity, either in food or dress or action, or to be freed from worry or work. The important thing felt in youth by every man worth his salt, is not to be happy and contented, but to be something and to do something. It is more life and fuller that we want. True simplicity must be distinguished from its shams and counterfeits.[1] The great things are the simple things, the great things in life and the great things in art and literature. But the simplicity of the great things is not inconsistent with variety. It is the way in which variety is subordinated, and difference harmonized in the perfect whole, that makes the simplicity of the effect. White light is simple, colourless: we have to see it broken up in the splendour of the rainbow before we can say we know what light is. Great art is simple, Shakespeare is simple, yet criticism and time cannot exhaust his infinite variety.

We may then dismiss the notion that the simple life for man, for society or the individual, is a life devoid of complexity

[1] "Simplicity did not mean baldness or monotony. The man of genius was usually far more complex than the ordinary man, but he had always within him a ray of light which illumined his complexity. A simple meal did not mean a meal of one dish and nothing else. A simple scheme of decoration did not mean a plain monotony of colour, or the absence of design. Simplicity did not mean a mere economy of labour. The simplest effects in literature and art were only got through immense labour. Simplicity is not the affectation of simplicity." (Professor S. Alexander in *Manchester Guardian.*)

and free from all things that make for complexity. What is simplicity to one man is complexity to another. There is no equality in ideals. To impose such an equality would lead ultimately to the lowering not only of standards of culture and manners, but of moral and mental standards as well. The communist has his vision of an artificially simplified social state, and when a man has a gospel we cannot object to his preaching it. It is through visions, through ideals, that man moves on to higher things. Ideals, like poetry, "enrich the blood of the world". But it is one thing to preach ideals, another thing to impose them. If the simple life is a spiritual thing, an attitude of the mind, a being, a becoming, it cannot be attained by legislative enactment, or by fixing a common standard of possessions or of labour or reward. We do not raise the standard at the bottom of the scale by driving it down at the top. The greatest and most successful example of the simple life by legal enactment was the State of Sparta. The Spartans sought the simple life by way of contraction, restriction, not by growth or expansion. The result was that they have left the memory of a brave, but of an incurably selfish, obstinate and stupid people. Sparta died of over-simplification, ossification of the heart and brain. To be free, to understand, to enjoy, is, we have been told, the claim of the modern spirit. If so, we shall be right in opposing any attempts to limit individual and social activities, in order to satisfy the silly demand for an impossible equality. What democracy wants is nothing less than the best of everything. What man has to aim at is the best life, not the simplest life. What the best life is, man has to find out, by failure and experiment, by alternate victories and defeats. The weary man, the disappointed man, the lazy man drop out. Centuries ago, they betook themselves to a monastery. Now they stand in the market place or at the street corner, and proclaim the gospel of communism. The secret of the simple life is the government stroke. But under the assumed conditions of economic equilibrium in the communist state, competition will not be abolished. There will be only a change in the direction of competition. The stimulus to get the better of one's fellows will remain, only on the basis of equality of reward, the competition will work downwards, not upwards, the competition to do less or worse or no better than the next man. To suppose that equality of reward will produce or maintain equality of production is one of the most extraordinary delusions that have ever taken possession of the human mind. "The devil take the hindmost" is not a maxim for a moral community or for a moral being, but there is, if possible, a still more objectionable maxim, "The devil take the foremost".

SOCRATES AS AN EDUCATOR.[1]

By JOHN ANDERSON, M.A.,
Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney.

I.—SOCRATES AND PLATO.

THE manner of his life, and still more the manner of his death, have made Socrates an outstanding figure in the history of European thought and morals. That his doctrine has not till recently been adequately understood is due to the fact that he wrote nothing and that his views, fully and clearly as they are expounded in Plato's dialogues, have been taken to be Plato's own. Owing especially to the work of the late Professor John Burnet during his occupancy (1892 to 1926) of the chair of Greek in the University of St. Andrews, it is now possible for us not only to recognise the Greek philosophers as the founders of modern science, but to distinguish and appreciate the contributions of Socrates and Plato to science and general culture.

The supreme importance of Plato is not diminished by the recognition, which his own dialogues enable us to make, of the extent of his indebtedness to Socrates. The marking off of the earlier dialogues as thoroughly Socratic permits of a more careful scrutiny of the later dialogues in which the doctrines of Socrates are either criticised or not referred to at all. It is from these, and most of all from the *Laws*, that, according to Burnet, Plato's position and influence are to be truly estimated. In his posthumously published work, "Platonism" (originally delivered as lectures in the University of California in 1926), Burnet actually claims for Plato a decisive influence on Roman law. "It is not, in my opinion, too much to say that what we call Roman Law is not so much Roman as Hellenistic, and that it has its origin in the *Laws* of Plato."

The explanation of this apparently extravagant claim is simple. The Academy, which Plato founded, was not only an institute for scientific research but a school for training rulers and legislators, and it sent out such legislators to a considerable number of Greek states, both during and after Plato's time. Their influence would naturally be in accordance with Plato's ideas of sound politics, and the fact that he spent his

[1] Acknowledgements are made to *The Journal of the Institute of Inspectors of Schools*, New South Wales, which published this paper in two parts in its issues of November, 1930, and June, 1931. The substance of the paper was delivered as an address under the auspices of the above Institute in July, 1930.

last years in drawing up the legislative scheme which is set forth in the *Laws,* shows that he wished the work to be carried on on the same lines. When, at a later date, these Hellenic states came under Roman domination, it was found that the original civil law of Rome was inapplicable to them, and the adaptable Romans solved the difficulty by developing a new system which embodied much of the Academic legislation of the conquered states. It was this system which spread throughout the Empire, while the older Roman law was confined to Rome itself and "became of less and less importance as time went on". This, Burnet contends, is the explanation of the extraordinary similarities between Plato's dialogue and what we now call Roman Law.

The educational proposals of the *Laws* are particularly important, as Burnet had previously pointed out in his "Greek Philosophy from Thales to Plato", for the estimation of Plato's originality and influence. Burnet lays special emphasis on the scheme of *higher* education elaborated in the dialogue. "We may easily miss the significance of Plato's proposals as to the education of boys and girls from the age of ten onwards. We must remember that in his day there were no regular schools for young people of that age. They were taken to one teacher for music-lessons and to another to be taught Homer, and there was no idea of coordinating all these things in a single building under a single direction with a regular staff of teachers. By founding the Academy Plato had invented the university, and now he has invented the secondary school. In consequence we find such schools everywhere in the Hellenistic period, and the Romans adopted it with other things. That is the origin of the medieval grammar school and of all that has come out of it since."

This recognition of the practical genius of Plato was not possible to those who regarded the *Republic* as the fine flower of Platonism, and neglected the later dialogues. It may indeed be said that it was at no time a reasonable view that Plato, in order to defend the memory of his master, Socrates, should have written dialogues attributing to him views that he never held. There would have been no reverence or even decent feeling about that. But it was only after the dialogues had been fairly definitely dated that Burnet could satisfactorily show, first, that all the dialogues up to the *Republic* expound a common philosophy, secondly, that, if this is not the philosophy of Socrates, we know next to nothing about his views, since all the alternative versions depend upon material arbitrarily selected from Plato's account, and, finally, that the later dialogues in which, with one explicable exception,

Socrates plays no prominent part, expound a *different* philosophy, which is led up to by criticism of the Socratic.

The difference is equally marked in the sphere of education and politics, and in the *Timaeus* we have a definite reference to the shortcomings of Socrates in this regard. The point is, as Burnet puts it, that Socrates "could paint the picture of an ideal state but could not make the figures move. He is made to confess that he could not, for instance, represent his state as engaged in the struggle for existence with other states; to do that men are required who by nature and training have a gift for practical politics as well as for philosophy." In a word, Socrates was deficient in the historical sense. He imagined, as the earlier dialogues show, that all social and political problems can be solved on purely ethical grounds, by direct reference to what is good. Plato, on the other hand, saw the impossibility of making progress by the application of an unreal standard of perfection, and the necessity of working with existing political forces. The life and teaching of Socrates showed him, as nothing else could, the opportunism of both the leading Athenian parties and the consequent political bankruptcy of Athens. But he did not despair of the political development of other Greek states, and though his efforts were unsuccessful at the time, they were not, as we have seen, without a considerable later influence.

II.—EDUCATION AND POLITICS.

The uncompromising attitude of Socrates rendered it inevitable that he should come into conflict with the Athenian state, though it was not until Athens was definitely on the decline that his teaching was regarded as a serious danger. Even if the democrats had not suspected that there was an actual connection between Socrates and the aristocratic party, his criticism of the existing form of government, threatened as it was both from within and from without, might well have been regarded as profitable only to their enemies.

This is the natural objection to any unhistorical political doctrine, anarchistic or theocratic, which appeals to an ideal "rule of right". The theory of rigid guardianship expounded in the *Republic* and the practical deification of Law in the *Crito* might be taken as decisive indications of the opposition of Socrates to anarchism. But, though there may be a difference in ethical conceptions, there is remarkably little practical or logical difference between the anarchistic and the theocratic positions. All our social and political difficulties will be solved, for the one, if we are governed by the spirit of equality and refrain entirely from oppression, for the other,

if we are governed by the representatives of God and refrain entirely from disobedience. Neither view can give us any idea of how such conditions can be satisfied or even approached, how we can promote equality or recognise God's representatives. But each implies that the existing temporal power does not exemplify the rule of right, that it holds its position by oppression or usurpation. And thus both tend to support, and especially to be regarded by the ruling body as supporting, those political forces which are "in opposition" but are striving to secure domination.[1]

We can see, therefore, that it was natural for the democratic rulers to desire to suppress Socrates. But this is not to say that that desire was to their credit, or that severe criticism of their regime was not called for. Certainly "Be guided by what is good" is inadequate as a solution of political problems, but a scientific consideration of what sort of life is a good one (and, for that matter, of what constitutes oppression) is not politically and socially valueless. What gave particular force to the Socratic criticism was that the political ideas of the democrats were themselves quite unhistorical. The worshipful Athenian people, the sacred tradition of the city, were just as ideally conceived and reverenced as any metaphysical "Good" could be. The demonstration of the hollowness of these pretensions may have been historically inadequate and politically negative, but, as far as it went, it was logically sound. And the disinterestedness of Socrates's criticism of the democracy and its leaders, as well as of those professional educators who were called Sophists, made it doubly strong. To teach the youth to accept the customs of the city in which they lived may have been an essential part of the theory and practice of "getting on", but it implied the existence of interested motives which such teachers were unwilling to reveal.

This fact alone gave Socrates an enormous dialectical advantage; and it was further increased, at his trial, by the existence of a political amnesty. In consequence the real charge of fostering aristocratic sentiments could not be brought, and the teaching of Socrates had to be attacked on religious grounds. Socrates pointed out in his defence that his accusers could give only the vaguest account of what his teaching really was, and he strongly denied that he was a teacher at all, in the sense in which they used the term. "If you have heard", he says to the judges, "that I undertake to educate men, and exact money from them for so doing, that

[1] For the sake of simplicity I have passed over the case in which the existing temporal power is itself regarded as representing God. But it is worth noting that such pretensions commonly provoke a religious opposition.

is not true; though I think it would be a fine thing to be able to educate men, as Gorgias of Leontini, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis do." In fact, if what these Sophists give is education, then Socrates is no educator, and he cannot be rightly accused of corrupting the youth by the inculcation of false doctrines, for he has never given doctrinal instruction to anyone.

But Socrates did not deny, but rather gloried in the fact, that he had striven by example and precept to inculcate the spirit of criticism, to encourage the questioning of received opinions and traditions; and nothing that the Athenians could do, he declared, would prevent his pursuing this task while he lived. "The unexamined life is not worth living"; to lead such a life is to be in the lowest state of ignorance, ignorant even of one's own ignorance. And therefore he would not cease to call upon the Athenians to give an account of their lives, as the facts of life would compel them to do even if they got rid of him.

The Socratic education begins, then, with the awakening of the mind to the need for criticism, to the uncertainty of the principles by which it supposed itself to be guided. This was utterly opposed to the doctrines of the democrats. What education meant for them is seen in the *Apology,* where Meletus, the leading accuser, describes Socrates as the sole perverter of the youth, while everyone else improves them; and again in the *Meno,* where Anytus, the democratic leader (who was really responsible for the prosecution, but kept in the background because the issue was nominally not political but religious), warns Socrates not to be so free with his criticisms of Athenians and their ways. According to these good patriots, to be educated meant simply to become a good Athenian, and that was brought about by enjoying the society of the respectable citizens of Athens.

Now the position of Socrates is simply that this uncritical acceptance of tradition, this acquiring of Athenian virtue, is no education at all. There is no virtue in being an Athenian, no peculiar and superior Athenian brand of goodness, but goodness is the same wherever it occurs, and what passes as good at Athens may not be really good at all. It requires the most careful scrutiny, and until this process of examination has begun, education has not begun. To see the full force of this criticism, we may substitute Australia for Athens, and imagine Socrates saying, "You think there is some virtue in being Australian, and that a good Australian is better than a good Greek or Italian, but what you call goodness is just your own ignorance." Clearly such talk would be infuriating,

clearly also it would be very hard to answer; for it would only be by way of afterthought, as a mere "rationalisation", that any suggestion as to what the local virtue consisted in, could be made.

III.—KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION.

For Socrates, then, what is fundamental to true education is not tradition but criticism. Tradition itself invites criticism, because it represents certain things as worth while but is unable to give any account of their value. Thus the aim of education is to give an account of things, to find out *the reason why,* and thus put knowledge in the place of opinion. Opinion is all that we get from tradition, all that we get from politicians and Sophists, all that the public, "the great Sophist", is concerned with. For all these what is current is correct. But what is current is a shifting and uncertain thing, it is not "tied down by the chain of the cause" (the reason why), and so may leave us in the lurch just when we are surest of it. Opinion may be right but only by accident, and without criticism, without the discovery of reasons, we cannot say whether it is right or wrong. We cannot even say whether we understand a received opinion in the same sense as does its promulgator, or whether, when we apply a tradition to a new case, we are not misinterpreting it. The only test is popular clamour, and that is the least steadfast thing of all.

Thus opinions and traditions change, and change without reason, and yet we continue to follow them. If we want to know what we are doing and thus have real guidance in our lives, we must get a grasp of sound principles; and such principles will be upheld for their own sake, and not because they have been handed on to us. Indeed, for the reasons given, they cannot be handed on but must be arrived at by a man's own thinking. Such thinking may, however, be stimulated by opinions and particularly by questions. Thus we find Socrates, in the *Theaetetus,* claiming the power of bringing men's thoughts to birth by means of this process of questioning, and this is the process of education as far as the educator is concerned. But the really important process is that which goes on in the mind of the pupil, and that is thinking or learning. If the aim of education is to be fulfilled, the Sophistic method of *instruction* must be avoided, and the dialectic method, in which the pupil is led to form his own hypotheses and test them, adopted. Instruction, by discouraging the critical exercise of the pupil's intelligence, prevents the real acquisition of knowledge.

This theory is worked out in connection with the doctrine of reminiscence as expounded in the *Meno* and the *Phaedo*. Under the stimulus of objects of opinion we recall those criteria or standards which alone give the former their meaning, and with which we were directly acquainted in a previous state. Divesting this view of its mythical character, we may say that the question is of finding certain self-explanatory principles, in the light of which we can estimate the transient objects of ordinary life, and thus have settled and organised knowledge. The systematic character of a man's thinking is the test of his progress from opinion to knowledge, as the orderly character of his actions is the test of his progress towards goodness.

Now this implies the ascription, in the Socratic theory, of a certain relative value to opinions and traditions. They may stimulate our search for what is of settled value and thus for an organised way of life. But in themselves they are inadequate, they cannot in the proper sense of the word be *learned*, because they have not been taken up into a self-explanatory system. The first point that Socrates always makes in his criticism of opinions and traditions is their mutually contradictory character. They imply a diversity of principle which is necessarily bad, weak and miserable; the only strong and happy life is the single-minded pursuit of the good. Here we have one of the weak points in the Socratic position, since it implies that all men should function alike. But this does not invalidate the characterisation of education as *the finding of a way of life*, as contrasted with the mere acquisition of a number of arts or accomplishments. As tradition may have a relative value, so may the development of a particular aptitude, but it must be made a part of an organised way of life.

We can see from this that Plato's scheme of secondary education owed something to the fundamental conceptions of Socrates. It is also of interest to notice that Socrates, in his criticism of the Sophistic training in accomplishments, was cutting at the root of the modern psychological theory of abilities. Abilities, taken by themselves instead of as part of the general activity of the individual, are falsified and misdirected. The determination of a "vocation" on the basis of a classification of aptitudes may rightly be called an *external* method of procedure, since the classification can be arrived at only by reference to the occupations that are offered. Thus our modern Sophists, as G. K. Chesterton points out, try to discover what job a man is fit for, instead of asking what way

of life is fitting for the man; they "temper the shorn lamb to the wind". Similarly, the eugenists desire to breed men for special characteristics, which they consider would be an improvement on existing characteristics, without giving any critical consideration to the notion of improvement or of goodness. "What's Wrong with the World," as Chesterton puts it in his book with that title, "is that we do not ask what is right". We proceed on the basis of notions of improvement, efficiency and fitness, we advocate special tasks, without inquiring what work is really worth doing.

What Socrates stood for, then, against the advocates of "up-to-date" methods of efficiency and specialisation, was co-ordination or integration of activities. Guidance, he admitted, is possible and desirable, but it must take place in a common and continuous life, and not by any isolated "test" of capacities, and it must aim at the greatest possible coordination of activities, and not at the isolation and development of some special activity. It is for this reason that the teacher, who has lived and worked with the pupil, is the best judge of what he can do. But to be a judge he requires above all to inquire into what is best, to ask *the reason why,* and not take it for granted that existing demands (opinions) must be satisfied; and in pursuance of this policy he will also encourage the pupil to ask the reason why. In this way real guidance and a really coordinated life are possible. And, if we discount the Socratic over-emphasis on ethics, we can still derive from his theories a recognition of the necessity of considering every way of life in its full social and political context. The Socratic view thus finds an interesting modern parallel in the slogan of Lenin, "Every cook a politician!"

It is true that in the ideal state portrayed in the *Republic* real political understanding is supposed to be confined to the ruling caste. This is due to the way in which Socrates divided knowledge from opinion, to his contention that the former is concerned with special objects, the forms or standards, instead of simply involving a more critical treatment of the same objects. But this can largely be corrected by means of his own theory of logical coordination. The method Socrates adopts, however, is to allow a certain relative value to opinion and consequently to a life which, though not itself inspired by understanding, obeys the dictates of understanding. In fact, preliminary education precisely takes the form of learning to go about things in the right way, and only after that can we enter on a course of higher education and get to know what makes such actions right.

IV.—THE PLACE OF DIALECTIC IN EDUCATION.

The final working out of the educational theory of Socrates is thus to be found in the first and second schemes of education elaborated in the *Republic*. The early training of the guardians (which is all the training given to those who are not fitted for higher study) produces right opinion, or ability and willingness to follow the dictates of those who have knowledge, but does not produce knowledge. Or, to employ the distinction drawn in the *Phaedo*, it cannot give true or "philosophic" goodness, but only "popular" (or civic) goodness. "The former", as Burnet puts it, "depends on intellect, the latter on habit. It is the former alone that is teachable; for it alone is knowledge, and nothing can be taught but knowledge. The latter is only good at all in so far as it participates in the former. Apart from that it is a shifting and uncertain thing." That is to say, the early education must be directed by those who have had the later education, and not by those who can themselves lay claim to no more than opinion. There is a logical difficulty in that, if the goodness acquired in the early training really "participates in" (*i.e.*, partakes of the nature of) true goodness, it cannot be a mere matter of habituation but must partake of critical activity as well. The concessions which Socrates makes to "opinion" are really due to his anti-historical bias, and weaken, instead of strengthening, his critical case. What should be recognised (as Socrates himself has enabled us more clearly to do) are the different factors of guidance and originality, but these should both be present at any stage in the process of education.

The unhistorical character of the theory of early training in right habits appears in the complementary assumptions of a purely imitative faculty in the pupils, their original tendencies being neglected, and of the existence of "wise and good" educators, whose simple business it is to set up proper models of behaviour, and who are not themselves learning in the educative process. The *Ethics* of Aristotle is based on the same assumptions (being largely derived from the *Republic*), and thus passes over the critical problems of ethics and education. "Conditions of soul", Aristotle says, "arise from activities of like character to the conditions." We become good by doing the right thing, *i.e.*, the thing the good man would do under the same circumstances; and therefore he must be there in the first place to tell us what to do, so that we may acquire the habit.

The alternative to this guidance is that we should be subject to the misguiding influence of pleasures and pains. "It is pleasure that makes us do what is bad, and pain that makes

us abstain from what is right. That is why we require to be trained from our earliest youth, as Plato has it, to feel pleasure and pain at the right things. True education is just that." In his "Aristotle on Education" Burnet goes so far as to say of this that it "is the best account of the training of character that has ever been given and should be engraved on the heart of every educator". What it lacks, however, is any explanation of *how* the training takes place, how the affection comes to be transferred from one thing to another—unless the assumption of a general tendency to demand what we have become accustomed to (by having it constantly thrust upon us), is to pass for an explanation. Whereas Plato, in the *Laws*, goes on to take the child's spontaneous activities as of fundamental importance for any training he is to receive, the more rationalistic Socrates and Aristotle appear to regard him as a mere seeking and avoiding mechanism, whose development is determined by what he is allowed to get (or compelled to take).

The theory of habituation, then, is defective precisely in that it neglects the spontaneity of thought which had been emphasised by Socrates in his criticism of opinion or "what is accepted by all right-thinking men". We may therefore expect to find a correlative defect in his account of that spontaneity or of higher education. We have seen that the fundamental weakness of his philosophy is its unhistorical character, and this finds its logical expression in the attribution of true reality to certain unchanging "forms", or ideals, everything changeable being relatively unreal. It is in terms of these forms, Socrates holds, that it is possible to "give an account" of things. This raises the question of what account can be given of the forms themselves. They cannot each be self-explanatory, or they would be quite unrelated and would not form a system of reality. Accordingly the system itself, or, more precisely, its principle of organisation, has to be taken as the one self-explanatory entity; and this is what Socrates calls "the form of the Good". It is the one self-sustaining or truly spontaneous thing; and what we call spontaneity in ourselves or in other things is dependent upon it, and exhibits the degree of our or their harmony with it.

But when Socrates is asked to give an account of this "Good" itself, he can do so only in vague metaphor. This must be so; for if it is explained only by itself, clearly *we* cannot explain it. But in that case all that we are saying, when we postulate its existence, is that there is "something, we know not what", which is the ultimate explanation of reality. Obviously, in assuming that there is such a thing, we are not entitled to call it good, nor can we derive from what

is unknown to us, any assurance that some historical thing is good or is better than another. Hence in making his moral distinctions, in saying what should be studied and what should not, Socrates, just like the Sophists, is falling back on opinion. He, too, gives an "explanation" which is no explanation; he, too, has to depend upon "what is accepted by all right-thinking men"—only, his right-thinkers are not the same as those of Protagoras and other Sophists.

To show that Socrates was also infected by the Sophistry he criticised is not, however, to take away all value from his criticism or from his theory of higher education. It more especially explains the weakness of his scheme of early education, its moralistic character—particularly exemplified in the unæsthetic treatment of art, which is considered to be purely imitative and to have its value, positive or negative, solely according as it is or is not a good model for the pupils in turn to imitate. This view of art and education is typical of the *mechanical,* or "external", conceptions which Socrates elsewhere condemned, and which are condemned in the working out of that Dialectic which he regarded as the culmination of the higher education.

The theory of Dialectic itself implies that there can be no set of habits which are entirely in accordance with sound thinking and living, and therefore that habituation cannot be a sound method by itself; for Dialectic requires the unlearning of much that has been previously learned. It may be said, in fact, that there is an element of unlearning in all learning; we acquire new reactions to things by developing and altering old ones. The mind is never a *tabula rasa,* and therefore never merely imitative; but, as Plato recognised in the *Laws,* we have certain tendencies to begin with, and it is only by their exercise that we learn. We learn, that is, by trial and error, or, as in the Socratic theory of criticism expounded in the *Phaedo,* by the formation and testing of hypotheses.

What makes guidance necessary is our tendency to stick to established modes of reaction, in spite of confusions and errors. As education advances, the process of removing confusions becomes more of a deliberate act on the part of the learner. But, whatever be the degree of assistance rendered, the process of clarification involves the breaking up of fixed ideas, the rejection of hypotheses which have hardened into prejudices. Thus "clearing the mind of cant" is a characteristic of the educative process in general; and Dialectic is simply the theory of the kind of hypotheses it is necessary to reject—those, namely, which would make the prosecution of inquiry impossible, being set above our scrutiny. The most

prevalent form of this cant is the "disabling" of criticism, the treatment of the critic as an ill-disposed person, one who is not worth attending to, *because he criticises.* Such evasion of the issue is described by the educated as "illogical", but the pointing out of fallacies of this kind is a very small part of what is involved in Logic or Dialectic. Its full import can be grasped only when we consider it in relation to the most advanced studies, *i.e.,* to the sciences.

The special scientist, Socrates contends, uses hypotheses which he does not criticise and of which, in fact, he cannot "give an account". They are taken as defining his field of study, and within that field, or using those assumptions, he prosecutes his inquiries and arrives at his conclusions. Thus the mathematician arrives at "mathematical truths". But actually there is no mathematical truth, any more than there is an Athenian truth. Fields of study are not cut off from one another but mingle just as peoples do. And to treat each as a separate "world" is to fall into contradictions. It is the business of Dialectic to show that the supposed "indemonstrables" and "indefinables" of the sciences are not indemonstrable or indefinable, but are subject to investigation. Thus all hypotheses implying a division in reality require to be "destroyed" (or removed).

What this involves is that there is a single logic which applies to all the sciences, a single way of being which all their objects have; we cannot divide reality into higher and lower orders, for the difference and the relation between them would alike be indefinable and indemonstrable. Thus any "science" which affects to discover powers or faculties which "make things what they are", or to apply "laws" to "phenomena", is guilty of logical error. The Socratic theory of forms itself calls for dialectic criticism. And though Socrates maintains the possibility of finding the "reason" of these forms in a single ultimate principle, the very assumption of this principle involves a separation (between the ultimate and the relative) which requires to be removed. The application of logic to "reasons" leads to the conclusion, already obscurely apprehended by the first Ionian philosophers, that any explanation must be on the same level as the thing explained, so that the former in turn can be explained in a similar way.

But the discovery of illogicalities in the theory of Socrates does not affect the fact that he has given a valuable account of the conditions of scientific inquiry. And on this basis we get an important development of his criticism of specialisation. Every scientist should be a dialectician, critical of hypotheses and recognising the continuity of things, since

otherwise he will make mistakes in his science and be unable to correct them. In the same way, such activities as teaching and politics should not be regarded as trades or specialities. Every teacher should be an investigator, every politician a thinker. And, since the distinction between the different types of goodness falls to the ground along with the supposition of an unchanging reality behind history, the logical extension of the argument is, as already indicated, that every citizen should be a politician. No one else can do his thinking for him; and the least thinking will lead him to reject the political and social guidance of "experts" who have no social or political theory. It will readily be seen, for example, that such Sophistic cures for social ills as the encouragement of the "efficient" and the elimination of the "unfit" are based on no coordinated or logical view of society, and thus are merely prejudices to be removed.

But this is because society is viewed unhistorically, as a mere field for personal agreements and disagreements, and not as a developing thing. Socrates is wrong in assuming that social issues can be decided on the basis of a general principle of consistency or coordination, and his democratic opponents could rightly say that his proposals must really have had a more special source, must have arisen, that is, from a definite attitude on particular social questions. In general, we can criticise only by reference to beliefs which we definitely hold; otherwise there would be nothing to say for or against any disputed view. And unless this feature of logical criticism is recognised, the Socratic insistence on logic, the setting of criticism against instruction, is misleading. So long as we do not set anything above criticism, we can make progress; but we do so not by having any kind of higher knowledge, but by having opinions and acting on them, that is, by reacting on things which are as historical as ourselves. To have an opinion or belief is to hold something to be true, to be an actual fact, and we cannot make more of it than that; so that there is no place for the Socratic "knowledge". When this necessary correction is borne in mind, the position of Socrates can still be seen to be of real value in pointing the way to the discovery of educational and political truths—namely, by critical activity in science and politics.

THE NATURE OF REVELATION.

By Professor A. C. Fox,
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Western Australia.

As a starting point for this discussion we will assume three characteristics of revelation, partly suggested by A. Sabatier in his "Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion". They are, that revelation must be (*a*) internal and not external, (*b*) progressive and not static, and (*c*) moral and religious.

(*a*) It has been very common to think of revelation as a manifestation that is quite external to the recipient. On the basis of a radical separation between God and the world this is a legitimate implication. Of our own resources it is impossible to know God as he is, *i.e.*, through our normal mental processes or through the normal processes of nature. He therefore must make himself known by means which have their source and meaning outside of nature and mind, even though they come through nature to mind. This is the dominant notion of revelation in the early stages of religion. God speaks externally with an audible voice, he writes his will upon tables, or this will may be known through casting lots or taking the auspices. Later, and especially with the Jews, the word of the Lord comes more directly through man's utterances, but still in more or less mechanical or extraneous fashion, so that an abnormal state is regarded as a fitting occasion of divine revelation. Here too, as in Scholasticism, the underlying idea is of the great otherness of God.

When we discard this idea as alone sufficient (but not as entirely false) we will have to conceive revelation in another way. Our insistence is upon the inner oneness of God and man, wherefore we shall be led to expect that revelations will come first of all within man's mind. In order that this whole matter may be fruitfully explored, we must keep in mind the professed purpose of revelation, *i.e.*, the salvation of man. A man is saved when he is made one with the real in its wholeness. He is in the state that needs salvation when he is one with parts only of the real. (This means that the narrowly religious or scientific man needs to be saved just as much as the sensualist or the worldly-minded.) A man is saved, therefore, when he is made whole himself (*cf.* the expression in the Gospels) and takes definitely upon him the true image of the divine. But since it is the wholeness of man that salvation aims at, this wholeness being cradled in and a reproduction of the

divine wholeness, and since also salvation in its turn is the aim of revelation, we draw the simple conclusion that revelation must work within and upon man's spirit. To work externally to him, with its source and significance within an alien sphere, would be to fail in its saving purpose. The revelation must be a revelation of the saved life, of the God-filled life, and it can be so only as it is revelation within that life. I can be moved toward the God-like life only as I find that life stirring within me. It is then my part to give larger scope to these strivings, in the faith that they come from an active source who can fulfil their promise. Since my saved life is an all-round unity with God, how can revelation do anything for me unless it reveals God and myself already in union? And this means revelation within me. For let us be assured—this is a point to which we shall return—that revelation is an idle word unless it names that which has direct moral and religious results. If it names an external process or event, its connection with such results is difficult to discern.

It is to say much the same thing when we remark that revelation is as much of the nature of man as of the nature of God. This is in consonance with the general view which we may take of the nature of the universe, and of the relations between God, man, and nature. It is also in keeping with the claims of Christianity, which centres in the manifestation of God through a human mind and body. Frequently it is said (*e.g.*, even by A. Sabatier) that the aim of revelation is to make God known. I do not like this, because it smacks of that externalism which must be avoided at all costs. To be sure, "God" can be sufficiently widened to make the statement unexceptionable; but to ensure clearness it is preferable to say that revelation is of God in man and nature, and of nature and man in God. With reference to Christianity, the objectionable statement lends colour to the impossible attribution of two distinct natures to Jesus.

Accepting the preferable formula, it follows that revelation must come through ordinary experience. Here we oppose the ordinary to the extraordinary in the sense of the marvellous or miraculous. It is not to be denied that there may be moments of insight which stand out from all other moments; and these may be named extraordinary. But we do deny that these special insights need a unique and special apparatus, or a special arrangement of natural and human powers—that the order of the universe must be diverted for the moment to bring them about. Between special experience (in our sense) and that which is ordinary there may be a difference of degree but not of kind. For what do we mean by ordinary experience? It is a having to do with facts in their severalty and unity, but it is also a having to do with values in the same aspects. With

less than this it ceases to be human experience at all. Experience becomes religious when one knows, feels, and wills that the facts and values are resident and unified in a being who guarantees them—and further reflection will identify this being with the universe. Religious experience is ordinary experience raised to its best and enjoying the fulness of its meaning. Nor is our conclusion other than this when we return to the connection between revelation and salvation. What man needs is salvation as an experience, the salvation or elevation of his ordinary experience. Revelation then must have such experience for its medium and objective. A revelation of the meaning of experience must be a revelation within experience, and *vice versa*.

God is to be found wherever he is, and as her pervades all things he is to be found everywhere and in common experience. Now all experience must have the world for its object, but the world either in its partialness or its wholeness. When the object is partial it will be some natural happening (either mental or physical) or some set of such happenings. As God pervades these, such an object will give an experience of God, though in a relatively indirect fashion. But the object may be the whole of things, as in religious experience. When it is so, the man has direct experience of God, and there is direct conscious connection between the two. It is in such moments that the revelations come. It is discovery on the part of man and discovering on the part of God. There is full reciprocity. It is made through man's mind directly; for although God is in all things, it is in the human mind that he expresses himself most of all. If we think of the whole evolutionary process as a progressive revelation, then again he is most fully manifested in (what is so far) the ultimate stage of the process.

These direct and fuller insights seem to make the man more sensitive to the signs of the divine in " outer " experience. Included in this " outer " are the religious experiences of other men, and the simple or the systematized experience of natural processes. The former are themselves revelations in the normal sense, but the latter are also revelations. Both, however, can be revelations only to the person who has found God directly for himself : apart from this condition there can be no revelation for anyone. " If the light that is in thee be darkness, there will be darkness round about thee."

It is here that we come upon the need of intellection. It must not be supposed that revelation is a matter of detached insights. If it comes within and through experience, it will have some dependence upon the process of thinking. As St. Thomas points out, there is a *terminus ad quem* for thinking as well as a *terminus a quo*. It must have its data, but it must

also interpret them. We find accordingly that interpretation enters largely into the content of revelation. If we call God "Father", and do so advisedly, we must have thought a great deal in order to adopt that name. It will represent the meaning for us of all sorts of experience both "inner" and "outer". Thus it would be vain to base the name upon inner experience alone without considering whether the arrangements of nature corroborate it. In any case, it is a name that is derived directly from experience of social relationships, and is extended to God by a process of inference. If we attribute justice to God, once again we will depend upon direct insight but also upon cogitation. It is not otherwise when we come to the so-called mysteries of the Faith, *e.g.*, the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity. We are told that it is entirely beyond our comprehension how God could become embodied in human form, and that the very fact itself would escape us without a revelation. But—assuming that it is a fact—how did the awareness of it first come? It came first to Jesus himself, and in its fulness by means, no doubt, of an immediate intuition which overwhelmed him by its high significance. But careful perusal of the Gospel records suggests that Jesus came gradually to this conviction, in the sense that he was preparing (or being prepared) for it. The relationship between God and himself was matter of his chief attention for many years in the light of religious experience, of himself and of others, and of experience of natural and social arrangements. If we assign to the time of his baptism the first full assurance of his intimate oneness with God, we must remember that the Spirit (*i.e.*, the sense of a unique relationship and mission) drove him to a long period of solitary and arduous mental wrestling with the implications of his discovery, of reviewing the various ways of living out the life of which he had just become fully aware. The belief of Jesus that he and the Father were one was an interpretation of certain experiences, as was also his belief that the Father and all men could enjoy the same oneness. His conviction of a definite course of life incumbent upon himself was likewise born of hard thinking through many periods of perplexity. Other men found in him that which he had found in himself, partly by his active or oral testimony, partly by their recognition that such an experience as his was a full answer to religious need. On their side, too, an important part was played by intuition, but this was aided and made explicit by their thought about the matter. In a word, the doctrine of the Incarnation was an intellectual interpretation of certain facts. It had revelation at the core of it, no doubt, but the revelation was not in addition to the facts—as though God had dropped a signed document telling men what these facts meant—but it was in and through the facts. The facts contained their own

revelation inherently, and cognizable by all who had a sincere desire for the fulfilment of religious need.

According to our general account, revelation is a veritable act of God. But God being what he is, his revelations are not miraculous. They are not extraneous to experience, or brought to pass by modes of action foreign to its normal working. Rather do they set the standard for experience, and show what it can be when functioning at its fullest. If they show the high levels of the inner life, they also reveal the means for sustaining the life at that level; and this seems to have occurred with Jesus. The life marked by revelations is seen to be normal and natural and not at all supernatural in any special sense. It appears supernatural only by contrast with the low level of average living. If Jesus has any religious significance, it is in revealing the wealth of Reality that can be expressed in man when man accommodates himself to its values and processes. And he signifies in respect to revelation that its proper mode is natural and permanent, and not miraculous and intermittent. To take miracles as the credentials of revelation is to reverse the true order of evidence.

There is just one more important consequence that should be made explicit. No revelation can be acknowledged as such unless it comes to the person precisely as a revelation *to him*. In this business there can be no exclusive monopolies. Revelation may come originally to one person, but to others it can have the same character only as they reproduce the original experience in themselves. This condition need not hold on the view that external propositions are made known for passive acceptance. One man has had the experience, others reap the benefit of it without the preparation or labour. Revealed truth is propagated by merely cognitive teaching and learning. But in fact this is not the way in which it is propagated, if it is to have saving force. It is conveyed by one person to another by a kind of contagion. He who has had the insight becomes aflame with its inspiration, and others take fire from contact with him. He has certainly had his cognition clarified, but his life of feeling and effort has also been enlarged and transfigured. The only adequate description of what happens is in terms of a new birth, a being "born again". The new insight answers the demands of his whole personality, and if we seek for authority, then he himself is the embodied authority of that which he proclaims, and it is his transfigured personality much more than his words that comes upon others with revelatory power. There can be no authoritative mediator between God and man save the authoritative embodiment of the *living* truth, and its function is to efface itself by bringing God and man into immediate unity.

(*b*) The second mark of revelation is that it is progressive. This is a natural consequence of its coming through experience, and of its dependence upon interpretation. To be fully comprehensible it must be thought out, and it will be thought out in terms of current notions about the world and man. To be a revelation at all it cannot outstrip experience and knowledge, since it is the illumination of these. On the other hand, it cannot be given once and for all, unless with certain reservations which we will notice shortly. God, nature, and man are the three factors in revelation. Even if God and nature do not change, it is certain that man does, and in some very important ways, notably in his knowledge of the world and of himself, and in the practical arrangements of his social life. With these changes will go alterations in his interpretations of the nature and the ways of God. These changes in the content of revelation will be progressive to the extent that knowledge and social life are progressive. The emphasis here is not on the necessary contradiction between the end and the beginning (this may occur in details), but upon the development of the one out of the other. The continuity is of more importance than the contradictions, both in idea and in fact. This is a valuable principle to use in determining whether the course of revelation has produced any results of permanent worth, any truths that will not afterwards be set at naught. It has particular bearing upon the question whether Jesus is the final revelation.

Just because there is genuine development we may look for the occasional emergence of permanent results. To deny this is to imply (under the general view that we take of revelation and of the place of interpretation in it) that man gains nothing permanent through the evolution of his knowledge and sociality. This in turn would mean that there is no fundamental characteristic in either knowing or human nature. If there is nothing essential to knowing, we must admit that man cannot be a rational being. Similarly, if there is nothing essential to man as a social being, if on the contrary he is a being of chanceful changes, then social life as we know it will be impossible to him, and "practical" reason will vanish from the earth. In a word, the demand for some permanent results of revelation is based upon the demand for man's essential rationality, and therefore upon the belief that, through his errors and imperfections, he has caught some glimpses of the true and the perfect. So it is possible that in a revelation to any one man or age, there will be elements that will stand for later men and ages. But there is the other side of the matter. It is certain that there will be elements that will not stand fast; to later men some of these will seem positively false, others will need re-interpretation. And if interpretation was necessary at the first, why should not it continue to be needful

as time goes on? Even the person and words of Jesus cannot be exempted from this rule. They, too, must be brought to the test of modern knowledge and needs, and be subjected to whatever re-interpretation may seem necessary. The one proviso is that we keep in view throughout the claims of religion; for it must be repeated that a revelation will be an irrelevance to one who has no living sympathy with religion nor feels its stir within him. One who has this sympathy will be no less ready to be judged by revelation than to be its judge.

(*c*) Having said so much, there is little that needs to be said on the third mark of revelation, *viz.*, its religious and moral character. By "religious" we do not mean that its content must be conveyed by a religious organization through its teaching function, by an *ecclesia docens* to an *ecclesia credens*. This may be required, but it is not the essence of the matter. Nor do we mean dogmas that are the bases of religious rites and ceremonies which in turn symbolize them. We mean rather that revelation is religious because it comes in religious experience, because it *is* religion, and without it as personally received there can be no religion. And by "moral" is meant that the value of revelation is largely in its ethical results; that if it has no such results springing directly from its reception, it is no revelation. One defect of the pretended external revelation is that it is likely to fail in this very respect. The religious requirements are met by assenting to the dogmas even though one does not understand them, and by trying to make some sort of approximation to a moral ideal which is as external as the revelation. There will be no sense of having been "born again", or of receiving direct impulse from the revelation towards a moralized life. This, however, is just what revelation should do for us.

After all has been said, there may remain a doubt as to whether religious truth needs a revelation as in any wise a special making known of it. We insist upon its internal nature, upon God as the all, and upon nature and man as in God and expressive of him. Will not man come to know religious truth as readily and as surely as he comes to know anything? Will he be able to help knowing it? Well, there is empirical evidence that ordinary knowledge has to be won; it does not come automatically and without effort. But the effort to know meets with what seems to be like a response from the object. There is also empirical evidence that religious knowledge has to be gained through suitable preparation. In both cases there is a "response" from the object, in that what is discovered leads inevitably to further discovery: reality seems waiting to disclose itself to such inquiry, and the inquiring mind is compelled to go on and on in conformity with the nature of the real.

Here, again, we touch the all-pervading rationality or coherency of the real. It presses the whole of itself upon us as we are able to bear it. In comparison with what we already know, our further cognitions will appear as revelations. From the point of view of religion, with its assumption of the personal nature of the real, the cognitions will be as the deliberate unveilings of God. It is in this manner that religious truth cannot be known unless it is revealed, and that we have an intelligible conception of what is known as " the grace of God ". That doctrine is popularly understood to indicate that God takes the initiative in revelation and salvation. We can agree with this, on the understanding that the turning of the soul to God is his act within it, with which the soul itself has freely identified itself, since reality respects our individuality : it is *many* as well as one. We may now say that inasmuch as it does this, and we in turn respect and seek for its universality, do we have the high religious moment of the soul, the moment of revelation. In principle this will differ not at all from the mode of any secular revelation, as in science ; where it will differ will be first of all in the object or content of the revelation, *i.e.*, in the status and power of the values and of the all-inclusiveness of the object as total reality ; and secondly, in the peculiar subjective attitude that is found in the religious moment—the attitude of humility, of trust, and of adoration.

A NEW MAGNA CHARTA.

By H. Gibson.

In Australia, as in various other parts of the civilized world, most of us are under the delusion that we live under the protection and enjoy the privileges of self-government. Considering the spectacle of strife, chaos, muddle and ineffectiveness presented by the parliaments of our supposedly self-governing communities, it seems time to ask ourselves if it is not possible to conduct our affairs with something of decency, order and harmony, and in such a manner as to enable us to proceed along the path of progress steadily, consistently and systematically.

It seems needless to say that parliament should be a representative institution; but we may ask what it is supposed to represent, and therefore, what should be the basis of representation. Most people are agreed that it should represent the members of the community. But a man is not necessarily represented merely by recording a vote.

The basis of our present representative system is a geographical one; we might with almost as much reason make it a numerical or an alphabetical one, or classify men according to their height, weight, or age. It is really not an easy matter to represent a man in parliament, even approximately; to represent him absolutely is impossible. But although absolute representation is impossible, we may strive for a truer, juster representation than we have at present.

If man were constitued simply of one element, it would be an easy matter to represent him. But he is a creation of infinite complexity. He is compounded of hopes, desires, ideals, abilities, faculties, capacities; in him good and evil are inextricably mixed; god and devil strive for supremacy. In the last resort, no man could possibly devise any expression of himself, in any form, that would embrace all of which he is constituted, and all that is woven into the structure of his being.

It is impossible to represent all of him; it would not be advisable to do so if we could; what then shall we represent? It would seem that he should be represented according to that activity or function which he has chosen as the channel whereby to express his own individuality, and whereby he enters into relation with his fellows, affects their lives and influences the work, the status and the progress of the community: that is to say, we should represent him according to his trade, profession, or calling. His life's occupation gives us the best

general indication of his ideas, ideals, interests and capacities, furnishes the best approximation of his character and his achievements, and provides us with that natural and equitable classification, according to which he should be represented in the institution by which he is governed.

Turning now to that institution itself, let us glance at its organization. Its organization is based on its functions, legislative and administrative. The houses legislate, the government administers. At the head of the government stands the premier, the ministers control the various departments of State and the members determine the laws.

What are the qualifications we would ask to see in premier, ministers and members? The premier should surely be that man, who for his character, statesmanship and qualities of leadership, is held in the highest esteem by the majority of the members; the heads of the departments should be those who, because of natural aptitude and experience are best qualified to control the activities of these important governmental institutions; and the members should be, not the representatives of so many geographical units, but the representatives of those things that are vital and dynamic in political life, the work and the ideals of men, the various activities in which their lives are expressed, the various lines of development and progress along which man is proceeding.

Parliament, instead of embracing in its constituent elements the representation of all those forces and interests that make for progress and development, is compounded of but two great forces, mutually antagonistic and characterized by greed, selfishness, unscrupulousness and hatred. Parliament, instead of representing all the various elements in our civilization, and having as its aim the welfare and progress of all, has become a public arena where Capital and Labour fight their unworthy battle with little or no consideration for the rights of the other members of the community.

If each individual were truly represented in parliament, he should, in theory at least, state his case to the member representing him; that member should have the views of each of his constituents and represent substantially their ideals, aims and work. But what happens? The candidate does not attempt to find out what his constituents think; he tells them what to think. He does not even think for himself. He, too, is told what to think. He obeys the political masters who decide on the policy of the party. Thus all political power, instead of being equally distributed among the members of the community, is gathered into the hands of a few leaders in each of the great political camps, and under the forms and institutions of democracy we are governed by a despotism as real as any that existed in the Middle Ages.

The political unit for the purposes of election is a geographical one, the constituency. But it is not a true unit. In each constituency we find men of all trades, professions and callings, men of the most diverse and conflicting interests, ideals and aims. Yet these diverse and conflicting elements are all heaped together into one heterogeneous mass of, politically, mutually repellent humanity and labelled a constituency. It is impossible to reduce the thought content of such a political unit to harmony; it is as easy to mix oil and water. Imagine the chaos if all the members of an average constituency, the doctors, lawyers, clergymen, the farmers, tradesmen, public officials and labourers; if all types of culture, ranging from the finished university scholar down to the illiterate incapable of signing his own name, were to meet together and attempt to reduce their collective thought into one harmonious and unified whole; yet one man, the member, is supposed to sum up and represent in himself the various elements of such a constituency.

For the great majority of us the franchise does not at present provide a medium through which we can express ourselves. The candidate does not stand before us and make himself acquainted with us, in order to represent us. He only makes us acquainted with the ideas of that group of leaders who control the party of which he is a member. In effect, he says: "This is what my party proposes to do; does it buy your vote?" We do not get a chance to express ourselves; we only get a choice, and reluctantly we exercise it, of choosing what we deem to be the lesser of two evils.

The premier should be that man elected by the representatives of all the trades, professions and callings of the community, who because of his character, statesmanship and abilities is the fittest man to place at the head of the government. In reality, he attains his high place because he is the leader of one of two extreme and opposing parties. His character is that of the successful political fighter, his statesmanship is reduced to a mastery of political intrigue and chicanery, and his abilities are of that order which find most favour in one or other of the great political camps, where ideals have ceased to exist, and where greed for wealth and lust of power dominate the political life.

The heads of departments should be those men who by experience and natural aptitude are, among all the members of parliament, best fitted to control and superintend the work of the several departments. Actually, they are chosen from only one of the two great opposing camps, and naturally, are selected not so much for public spirit as for party zeal, not so much for national patriotism as for party loyalty. The portfolios fall, not necessarily to those best qualified to hold

them, but to the party's best fighters, and it often happens that the best man is excluded to make way for the party man.

Parliament purports to represent the people of the country. But because we have chosen the geographical unit as the basis of our system of representation, the identity of the *man* has become lost in the *place*, and parliament, instead of representing the hopes, ideals and work of its constituent elements, its varied and ever-developing activities, its specialized workers, its scientists, artists, writers, idealists, has become, to borrow the words of Metternich, and using them in a different sense, a mere "geographical expression". And because parliament does not truly represent the people of the nation, we are presented with that spectacle of chaos and ineptitude that characterizes the political life of the time.

Putting the matter broadly, this is what happens: When an election takes place, the voter is asked to choose between the representatives of the two great opposing factions, Labour and Capital. Between these two sections of the community wages a bitter struggle, and the whole mental outlook of the rival candidates tends to be warped by the intensity of the hostility each camp feels for the other. Prejudice, not toleration; class hatred, not friendly rivalry; self-interest, not patriotism, are the feelings with which each is animated. They are mere fighters fighting under a doubtful code. These are not the circumstances under which our political leaders should be chosen, and this is not the type of man we should choose.

The basis of our representative system should not be a geographical one. Men should be classified, not on the basis of *where* they are, but of *what* they are. Our electoral rolls should contain, not lists of names of residents in towns, but lists of names of people following their occupations. A man's occupation is more important than his address; his work counts for more than his location. A man is summed up in his work, which, so far as the nation is concerned, is of far greater importance than his place of residence.

Voters classified according to their occupation would represent a homogeneous social class, animated by similar social aims and ideals, of identical interest, concerted in action, working towards a common end. The geographical constituency constitutes a mere mass of conflicting interests and diverse social aims, of antipathy and class hatred, and embraces not one element of welfare common to all—except such as fall within the province of local government.

Let us look at the matter from another point of view. Reserving to himself his own idea of progress, every rational man will concede that man's destiny is to progress; that in progress he finds the most desirable outlet for his energies;

and that only by progress can man rise to greater heights of material and spiritual achievement, and attain more and more to rational happiness. Whence comes progress? Progress comes from the thinkers. Capital organizes and Labour performs; but ideals, attainments in art, discoveries in science, inventions in the material world, all that tends to lift man spiritually, all that enables him to gain control over the forces and phenomena of nature, all that gives him power and makes him what he is, raises him above his pre-existent lower self, draws him along the path of enlightenment and progress, comes from the thinkers. And the thinkers are not represented in the institution that directly controls our national destiny. No thinker, no artist, writer, scientist, inventor, no educated or professional man is, as such, represented in parliament. The representatives of the workers and organizers are there: *they* have direct representation. But the thinkers, the most important section of the community, are not represented. This is a grave injustice and a national calamity. Some means should surely be devised through which this most important element could influence directly the national destiny.

Is it impossible to devise an occupational basis for the election of the national representatives? Without going into any details and considering the matter broadly, it does not seem an impossibility. To every man or woman can be definitely assigned an occupation, and where an individual is engaged in more than one occupation, the problem would solve itself, as he or she would automatically elect to be classified under that occupation wherein his or her chief interest lay. Married women would choose the same classification as their husbands, or another if interested therein. In this matter there could be perfect freedom, as no person would elect to vote under any classification except that in which he were primarily interested.

If we consider now the number of representatives required, there does not seem to be any insuperable difficulty. Perhaps the number could be allowed to remain approximately the same as at present. Where the number of people engaged in any particular calling is small, they would be included with the nearest allied calling, such inclusion, of course, being governed by the obtaining of the nearest practicable approximation to a just allocation of numbers. It would not be advisable, for various reasons, to attempt any allocation of political power according to a computed scale of usefulness to the community. The principle of representation by one man, of approximately equal numbers of voters, would be maintained.

The voters of such electoral units, classified on the basis of occupation, pursuing similar ends, united by common interests, animated by common ideals, would select, preferably

though not necessarily—for the professional politican is not inevitably an evil—from their own number, a parliamentary representative. It would be to their interest and his to see that such representative understood their work and their aims, their value in the social and economic life of the country. In this way we should have parliamentary representatives embodying in themselves and representing a given aspect, activity, or phase of our national life, and representing something definite and unified, standing for an aim and ideal common to all represented. Parliament would then be a true epitome of all that is comprised in our national life, its activities and interests, its varied forces, and would constitute a really national assembly.

At the present time political life is centred merely in the struggle between Capital and Labour, and everywhere else the leading characteristic is stagnation. The attitude of the great majority of people is one of indifference and apathy. To a certain extent this applies even to those who rank themselves under the banners of Capital and Labour, since no real or lasting benefit can accrue to either from the never-ending struggle. But if electors found themselves combined in occupational groups, a new spirit would be infused into our political life. There would be an incentive in each occupational group for the members to meet together to discuss common interests, to evolve plans for the betterment of conditions, and to see that their representative was fully posted in the aims, conditions and requirements of the group. At the present time, what incentive is there for, say, a doctor, a dairyman, a teacher and a plumber to get together and make plans for the betterment and amelioration of the condition of themselves or any one else. Yet these and every other variety of individual are heaped together into one conglomerate mass and supposed to constitute a political unit.

Let us suppose, then, that we have classified our electors on an occupational basis, and that each group has chosen at representative one in sympathy with their ideals, one conversans with their interests—and preferably of identical interests—one animated by a desire to do his best for their interests in the assembly of the nation. Parliament is then no longer composed merely of two parties; we have no longer the spectacle of but two sections of the community arrogating to themselves the whole of the political power of the country. The house proceeds to the election of the premier as a shire or municipal council elects its mayor or president. He would be the man who, in the opinion of the majority of the members, exercising their choice with a free conscience, and held in no degrading bondage to a great political party, possessed in the highest degree the qualities of statesman and leader, and whose character was in

keeping with the high position he was to fill. The premier, elected, would form his cabinet. Because he had no great party to serve, and no hard-fighting satellites to placate, he would place at the head of the great departments of state those men who, in his opinion, were best fitted for the work. A minister would be retained or appointed according to his abilities. The administration of the nation's affairs would not then suffer according to the fluctuation of the political power of two sections of the community.

Broadly speaking, the only medium at the present time for the enactment of legislation is one or the other of two great political parties. The tendency is for all legislation not affecting one or the other to receive scant notice. Each legislates in its own interest. When a measure affecting any other section of the community comes before the house, the great majority of the members must be true to a party, and vote according to the interests of that party. The measure is judged, not on its intrinsic merits, but according as its enactment will affect party interests. Thus national progress and the welfare of all are at the mercy of two classes, whose mutual antagonism blinds them to every issue in which their own interests are not directly concerned. But in a parliament representing every national interest the rights of the various sections of the community would receive more equitable consideration, and those measures making for national progress, welfare and happiness, would be considered and judged by free men, answerable only to their own constituents, dominated by no powerful and far-reaching organization, owning no allegiance to a party whose chief characteristics are greed, selfishness, prejudice and hostility to every interest but its own. Where all are represented the interests of all would be paramount, and the interests of each would get fair play.

Under the present system it is possible for any tricky politician with a taste for intrigue and a love of the limelight, by seizing on the psychological moment and securing a vote of "No Confidence" in the government, to plunge the country into the inconvenience and expense of an election. This is only possible because the government is constituted, not of elements chosen from the whole body, but of party members. Party and government fall together. But with the destruction of the party system such undesirable incidents would automatically cease.

Does such a conception of a new political organization open up further vistas of reform? At the present time we behold the representatives of the governments of the world meeting in conclave to discuss measures for the preservation of the peace of the world, while the whole structure of political international relationship totters visibly, and the civilized world stands

on the crumbling verge of a pit of unimaginable horrors. Is it possible that the inability to deal definitely and effectively with the question of international relationships is traceable to the constitution of the houses of parliament from which those representatives are sent, and from the dominating party of which they receive their instructions? Those houses, like our own, represent, broadly speaking, only two great factions characterized by all the faults which we perceive in our own. In every civilized country in the world at the present day, political power is held by one of two or three great factions. No national parliament truly represents any nation. It seems a strange thing that the individuals of the nations are filled with a horror and detestation of war, and that over the whole civilized world the dread of a new conflict hangs like a pall, paralysing the thought and energies of mankind, and yet their alleged representatives, those bodies supposed to sum up and epitomize in themselves the thought content of the nations, appear powerless to do more than stave off temporarily the inevitable calamity. Is it because they are not the representatives of the nations? Is it because they, like our own parliaments, represent only a part instead of the whole of the community? In their assemblies also, political power is gathered into the hands of a few, and we find the same selfishness, lust of power and obliviousness to the rights of others, the same class obsession and class hatred with which we are confronted here. Is it not incredible that the parliaments of the civilized world, wherein should be focused the political intelligence of civilized nations, can do no more than allow the huge aggregations of civilized humanity to drift helplessly into war, war in which the very best that is in man, his intelligence, working through scientific knowledge, creates new and ever more hideous methods of destruction, until the accumulation of horrors becomes too appalling and humanity shrinks even from contemplation? Is this helplessness and ineptitude that characterize the conduct of international politics due to the fact that, generally speaking, Capital controls the destinies of the world? There is nothing wrong with the capitalist. As such, he deserves the admiration and esteem of all. Not the capitalist, but the political organization is to blame for the chaos existing in international relationships. The capitalistic misuse of power is to be traced to the political organization. He is only a part of the community and we have allowed him to stand for the whole. He has done his best and if he has failed, it was only because the task was beyond him.

We come to this then. The present organization of political power results in chaos and ineptitude in national life, and a possibility of horrors in international relationships that we hardly dare contemplate. Yet as we are in the mass

rational beings, so should our parliaments, if truly representative, be rational also. Yet who but a lunatic could find rationality in the internal muddle everywhere existing, a muddle likely to burst forth at any moment into the conflagration of a world war?

If the representatives of the civilized nations of the world meeting in conclave came from and were instructed by parliaments truly representing the nations, that is, parliaments representing every section of the respective communities, and if each national representative knew that those representatives with whom he was to confer came from and were supported by parliaments identical in character with that from which he himself came and representing nations filled with a horror and detestation of war, would not the atmosphere of international politics be cleared of a great deal of the suspicion and distrust at present prevailing? Under present conditions, each comes from a body where the industrial and commercial interests of each nation, mutually jealous of and equally aggressive toward the like interests existing in other nations, hold sway. These are not the men to whom should be entrusted the task of keeping the civilized world at peace.

This brings us to the conception of a world parliament. As the national assembly should epitomize the activities, interests and ideals of the people comprising the nations, so a world parliament should epitomize the interests, activities and ideals of the various nations of the world. Obviously a world parliament would not be composed of elements representing in such detail the diversity of human interests characteristic of and necessary to the organization of a national assembly. The classification would be much broader, otherwise a body would be created too unwieldy and cumbersome for efficiency. Under broader headings, including in larger approximate groups men and women of allied callings, similar station and wealth, of approximating interests and ideals, the individuals constituting the different nations would be classified, and that representative chosen, in the opinion of the majority, most capable of representing the general interests of the group. A world parliament so constituted, and meeting to discuss measures for the maintenance of peace and the general welfare of mankind, would be representative, not merely of one aspect of contemporary life, but broadly, of all. Not one element, but all the elements of which civilization is composed, would meet to discuss world affairs and decide the destiny of mankind.

It may not be out of place to consider here the beneficial results accruing from the action of an occupational unit, directing its energies towards social ends, and contrast such an activity with the operation of the political geographical unit. The parliaments of the world, like the constituencies into which they

are divided, are geographical units, and when the representatives of either meet together, the character of their work is in both cases identical, differing only in the degree of the calamities ensuing. Let us now make a comparison between the results of a meeting of parliamentary representatives and a world congress of, say, medical men. In the one case a false political unit is represented; in the other case we have a body of men representing one profession, specializing in one department of human activity and having a common basis from which to work. The results of the operations of the meeting which has its basis in the geographical unit needs no further comment. Contrast the benefits accruing to the whole world when men from different regions of the earth, working under different climates and among races different in physique, mentality and emotional reaction, confronted with different diseases or new aspects of one disease, attempting different methods in treatment and confronted with different resources in the practice of their profession, meet and compare notes, give and receive suggestions and plan world campaigns against the common enemy. In the one case we have an unnecessary aggravation of evils, in the other case we call into operation a force whose power for good, for the progress, the happiness, the amelioration of the sufferings of mankind is incalculable. In the one case is concealment and fear; each is afraid to show his hand; afraid of being overreached. Each tries to probe the other's mind and to conceal his own thought. The atmosphere is not one of good feeling and fellowship, rather the feelings engendered are those of suspicion and secret hostility. In the other case is no concealment or fear. Each is anxious to disclose all he knows and learn all he can. The motive is not to overreach the other and circumvent him, but to help him. The feeling engendered is one of mutual respect, each is animated by a desire to promote the happiness and relieve the sufferings of mankind, and all are united in a common ideal.

From whatever point of view the matter be considered, the occupational group would seem to emerge as the true political unit.

THE MAORI—A PROBLEM IN SOCIAL ASSIMILATION.

By W. S. Dale, M.A., Dip.Ed.,
Research Associate, Auckland University College.

The position of the Maori in the social organization of New Zealand is unique. Moreover, because of this fact that his position is probably without precedent in the history of the Empire, there are no laws which offer themselves by adaptation as a solution of the difficulties which embarrass him and conflict with white ideas and ideals. His right to a position of equality was won, in the early days, only through aggressive action which made him feared by those who sought to put him lightly aside as a " savage ". This point of view he neither recognized nor accepted. A close study of the history of the days prior to 1840 will show, quite definitely, that conflict often came through ignorance or wilful neglect of Maori social customs by the whites. But it is not entirely correct to assume that the blame was all on one side. If the whites sought to take by force what, under different circumstances, would have been freely given, if the whalers and chance traders confused the Maori with the Australian aborigine or " boy " from the Cape, the Maoris themselves were no less prepared to act first and talk afterwards. Tasman, mistaking action, precipitated trouble in Murderers' Bay. Such action was doubtless told and retold in village, garden, and fort within the confines of the tribal lands. It generated, possibly, a different attitude from that which a peaceful encounter might have brought about. This is, of course, merely conjecture. What can be said with certainty, however, is that, in the early nineteenth century, the North was definitely antagonistic because of the actions of the crews of the ships that made it their headquarters. The Boyd massacre was, in the ultimate issue, the natural result of breaking the law of *tapu*. Ruatara's shocking treatment by shipmasters was calculated to stir up resentment against the whites in general. The traders who substituted soil for gunpowder within the body of the keg received just treatment if the flax bale was filled, at the centre, with stones. It was poetic justice that land exchanged for trade goods from the whites was later discovered to be inalienable by the individuals who were responsible for making the deal.

Nor must those forerunners of civilization, the pakeha-Maori, the runaway sailor, escaped convict, be ignored. Each played a no inconsiderable part in a reorientation of Maori thought

and social organization. Certainly it can be established that the introduction of such codes as these men brought was neither the best nor even worthy of emulation by the Maori. Nevertheless, it was a step along the road. Slowly in the coastal tribes arose a concept of individuality. Perhaps when the philosophy of our history is written due credit will be given to that remarkable institution, the "pakeha-Maori". Here was demonstrated in a most unexpected aspect one phase of the mentality of the Maori. Realizing that trade with the whites must always be conducted at a disadvantage so long as there was no common basis in thought or in language, the native seized with avidity upon any white who was prepared to live in accordance with their customs. The reason for this is not far to seek.

The Maori was not accustomed to the chaffering of the market or a system of barter—he was denied these, but in place thereof he had a system of *utu* or compensation and *muru* (damages). Maning describes precisely how complete was the forced compensation. In another case a chief was allowed fire a *tupara* (shotgun). The "kick" from the gun so annoyed his person that he demanded the gun as *utu*, and was only persuaded to relinquish his claim to the gun by heavy substitution.

Moreover, the tribal organization was such that, while individuals might differ in opinion—they often did and said so quite openly—the word of the chief was generally accepted. Thus we find a system in which, on the one hand, the whole tribe spoke through a leader, whilst, on the other, a single individual bound only by his own cunning and craft met for trade. To meet on a basis of equality in thought and language the pakeha-Maori institution was evolved by the native. Fierce, indeed, were the quarrels over white men, and one imagines that the life was not even remotely akin to that of lotus eaters, for, once adopted, the whites, through force, were compelled to stay adopted.

With trade came another blow at the so-called communal system of the Maori. Up till this time neither money nor its equivalent had been evolved. Trading brought silver which, because of its comparative smallness, could be secreted about the person or in convenient hiding-places. This personal, intimate possession gave the individual greater power because it brought within his grasp the things he wanted. Hitherto, with barter, the intermediary handed the whole stock of barter goods to the chief, who, in turn, made a distribution. Whether it was equitable or not cannot be stated with any degree of certainty, but one is inclined to think that those of inferior rank did not come within the category of participants. But this is not all. The luxuries in the form of firearms and axes,

blankets and tobacco were eagerly sought for by those who came in contact with the white settlements. The only method by which such desires could be satisfied was by total alienation of claims to timber, crops, flax or handcrafts. What formerly had no intrinsic value now excited a different attitude of mind. It was potential wealth. The "tame" white man was the channel through to the market and the active agent in promoting the bargain.

This new aspect of life wherein possession denoted power had its effect upon work. The preparation of flax, hitherto confined to the requirements of domestic life, was increased enormously, for the demands from the traders appeared insatiable. Speed in output meant less care in preparation, less forethought in selection and wholesale destruction of plants. The ready sale at a reasonable value (to the Maori) of mats and similar handcrafts, too, was reflected in less elaborate work and, to a lesser extent, in a breaking down of the many social observances attending their manufacture. What had been, formerly, art directed into utilitarian channels now became less a mark of æsthetic life and more a trade. Where the Maori definitely commenced to lose the artistic in life can be placed at about this period, for blankets and oddments of "white" clothing now commenced to displace the native garments. Today we are striving to recapture these arts and crafts.

The first change of mentality in relation to life and social organization had scarcely made itself conscious when the missionaries arrived. It is strange how quickly the Maori embraced Christianity. The cult of *Io* had been confined, in its truest essence, to those of the inner circle. The rest of the people were more governed by a negative system—"Thou shalt not", as dictated by the law of *tapu*. As an instituted part of individual belief it served to direct his steps in war and peace, in toil and play, in sunlight and shadow. Be it gathering fish, berries or birds, the positive action depended entirely upon the *tapu*—the *tohunga* or adept in the particular field of activity.

Thus it will be easily recognized that while the initiated, smaller class were able to indulge in philosophy of no mean order as a study of the cosmogony of the Maori will prove, there yet remained a larger class who were ignorant of the true inner meanings of the *tapus* or local *atuas* (gods). This latter class attained a complete state of stoicism. A life lost at sea, a death of a relation, the failure of crops, a shortage of birds, a scarcity of berries, a disastrous war, or a mistake in weaving—in every case the reason was *tapu* or *tohunga*. Either a law had been broken and this was the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual offence, or it contravened the directions of the adept, which action must inevitably bring disaster to individual

or tribe. If either of these failed, then it was superior power in the priestly adept of some other tribe. There was no conception, apart from this, of the cause. The effect was evident, the primary cause bore no relation to any other aspect than those noted. The lore of the philosophic cult was, through sheer necessity, handed down orally. To deviate a hair's breadth from the original version was but to court disaster. With such a static system of moral philosophy it will be evident that the potential freethinker was likely to receive short shrift. Through such an one disaster would come upon the whole people. For such a reason his opinions would receive scant attention and rapid repression. Scope in higher thought was considerably restricted therefore, although the potentialities were there.

Inextricably bound up with this philosophic thought was birth. No one but those of "best" blood, *i.e.*, those of the chiefly lineage, could hope to gain the esoteric knowledge of the *whare wanaga*. While birth gave rights the possession of a retentive memory was the ultimate value, since no form of writing existed to assist the succeeding generations. Of the symbolic in promoting memory Elsdon Best has written at length. Such forms were only to be expected under the circumstances of life.

Briefly, then, religious thought was the prerogative of birth, while the correct interpretation of signs, omens and instruction in relation to sociality were confined to the adept.

Just as thought in relation to the material had changed to meet the first disruptive influence of white contact, so with the coming of the missionary came experience of a fresh cognition.

It was noted above that the Maoris embraced Christianity with remarkable celerity. The reason was probably twofold. Those who had studied the cult of *Io* realized, or possibly thought they did, an identity with that of "Jehovah" (*Iowah* in translation). Those who were not so included embraced it under pressure from the social superior or in order to be upon the same plane as those among whom his "blood" claim was either weak or entirely lacking. It was embraced as a means of class recognition, an attempt at self-assertion.

The records of Bishop Pompallier or those of the C.M.S. vanguard indicate that both causes were at work. Whole villages pattered prayers and hymns the true import of which they could not know, since they had not seen a white man but relied solely upon the words of those converts who had devout faith and knew their people. There was yet another force which must not be neglected. The white was less rare. There was an appreciation by the native that, although the missionary and the trader were of one tribe (presumably), the

former was evidently of a superior type—that akin to the *rangatira* evidently—who was giving valuable knowledge to all and sundry. It was, in effect, passing on the foundations of white culture and sociality to the Maori. Under such circumstances the gift was received willingly, was it not an aid to the understanding of the actions of these intruders? So native "blood" distinction received the first faint blow. At first it was imperceptible in the general confusion. It laid the foundations of the many *pseudo-rangatira* families who today flaunt themselves in Maoridom.

So the slave and the chief knelt down side by side to pray to a common deity of whom they had been informed. Certainly he was a benign deity, but he had yet to be "tried out".

The situation of the third phase was about the centre of these lands. The traders had accustomed the native to barter and sale and purchase. The extensive operations of the New Zealand Land Company, however, showed that the tribal land was likely to pass from native control completely. In early times there was no true conception of land alienation. Prestige was bound up with the tribal lands which were only lost at the expense of bloodshed. Whether the Company were sincere in their protestations that they had "purchased" huge blocks is immaterial. Equally so was the "fair price" theory. It assumed that the native had definite ideas of individual ownership and the ability to arrive at a reasonably honest estimate of price. How mistaken these ideas proved was not, at the time, apparent. By the same token the lands in the Bay of Islands purchased by Kemp on the Government's behalf were purchased on the same erroneous premise. The "surplus" tribal lands were surplus only in the sense that they were utilized neither for food purposes nor for settlement. The "just" price which varied from 1s. 6d. to 5s. an acre was quite as artificial since the Maori took the white man's "fair price". Summarizing then the period ending about the era of Hobson, we find the Maori beginning to think upon totally fresh lines. The beginnings of individual action were stirring throughout tribal life, the old standards of religious beliefs and attitude to the former gods were no longer the solely accepted codes. The Maori in his frantic haste to meet us upon a common basis was forced to develop a duality of thought, of behaviour and of attitude. That he has not yet learned to think solely in terms of "white" mentality can be proved by living in the *pa* or carefully scrutinizing the life of a local group.

If this assertion is correct, and there is no evidence to disprove it, then how much truer it was ninety years ago! To meet the trader on terms of equality was however difficult, the cross currents of *mores* came swirling over the simple stream of white codes and customs. To take was easy, to ignore

individual rights was customary, to deprecate the opinions of a minority was a virtue found in even the best tribes: how easy then when conflict with the white took place to resort to methods which experience and social custom had established as the correct form. But there was above all an innate honesty. Taking as compensation, in the light of social custom, was not theft, although it has often been pointed out that should cupidity dictate the exercise of *utu* a reason could always be found. True though this might be, it could not be organized for the spoliation of the white. Only when the desire became too great for further repression did the white trader find himself despoiled. Within the village he still lived his own life sharing food and certain possessions with fellow-villagers and family. His old-time customs had not yet lost their values, they were merely being translated into fresh terms for outside contact.

An artificiality was being produced which was essentially different from the diplomacy of early times. Where speech had shown how action would develop, now action developed without its aid. Early missionaries tell of strange action in distant villages when word was sent to them that the white man was coming. Efforts were made to please him in both material and spiritual planes. It was the translation into our terms of old-time hospitality, the custom of giving the best to the honoured guest. But because it involved acts which were essentially different from those of daily life it is safe to assert that they were artificial—even, as history showed, superficial.

In learning rapidly the Maori had grasped the husk believing it to be the kernel. Only perhaps on the east coast, hedged round by mountains and the sea, did the people come at the kernel without first grasping the shell. That they were fortunate there can be little doubt, their progress in sociality and assimilation of *pakeha* culture is ever moving onward, the goal is marked from generation to generation by strong yet careful leadership.

Within the two succeeding decades the Maori found himself drifting badly. By embracing Christianity and white ideals, by ceasing to have complete faith in either himself or the white people, he was an easy prey to unscrupulous leadership. We, on the other hand, with the placidity which marks much of our colonial policy, believed the Maori thoroughly civilized. Only the few realized the care and patience necessary to make the native a valuable citizen. Crass stupidity made *Te Kooti* an outlaw, a leader, a prophet where formerly he was but a loyalist. Clark, the first "Protector of the Aborigines"! (save the mark), tells how fiercely he fought for justice for the people in the land courts. Lack of appreciation of Maori motives made scoff of the suggestion that "since today is Sunday we did not expect attack". Ask any army officer

whether he has known an enemy to offer safe escort for food trains because he disliked fighting those who were weak through lack of supplies. Inquire whether it is customary to give notice of the time of attack so that preparations can be made to ensure a reasonable defence. Such actions indicate the mentality born of two social cultures—the sense of fairness engendered by the tenets of a religious belief as preached by the missionary, and the instinct of fair play as understood by native culture. It was assumed that our ideal terms of thought and custom were those which he had been forced to assimilate rather than those dictated by an ever-changing pressure. The disastrous wars which mark the period prove conclusively that much more blood would have been spilt had the native not absorbed our ideas. The trouble was a form of mental indigestion. Ideals failed to give him the key to the situation. He neither reacted as we expected nor did his reaction imply acceptance of our domination. We offered the weapons which he accepted and then we fought with others. Let me revert for a minute to *Te Kooti*. As a loyalist soldier he went across the river to the *tangi* (mourning ceremony) of a relation. In accordance with the custom he presented the dead with a present, a Government rifle and ammunition. Upon his return to camp he was charged with desertion and with supplying the enemy with arms! The official mind failed entirely to grasp the whole mental attitude of *Te Kooti*, to say nothing of the sociological setting. So another rebel was made.

Another aspect of this period is the continuance of war in its old setting. Brother fought against brother only to mingle freely later. The war in the North was marked by a friendliness of the combatants " between times ". The whole relationship bore the stamp of earlier days, for no serious conflict had offered itself for study until now. For this reason each side followed the custom of its people. The soldiers were ever on the alert, while the Maoris seemed in no hurry to attack. Time and time again the whites waited attack which did not materialize.

It was only when the native gained experience of our ideas that sheer massacre took place. Opepe was the outcome of our persecution of *Te Kooti*, Gate Pa was the result of bungled diplomacy. To state that in earlier times (prior to the eighteenth century) warfare was merciless is perhaps true, but in such periods hereditary enemies were known, the periods of attack, *e.g.*, after harvest, were often recognized, methods of attack were more or less static, moreover the personal factor, that of bravery, counted more where weapons were standardized upon a primitive basis. These old vestiges of organization failed when the strength came from firearms and strategy. So through bloodshed the native received another lesson in

the "New thought". The white-man's code was combated in certain districts by cruelty, in others by flight and avoidance of pitched battles. In general, the veterans stoutly maintain, war was marked by bravery and a stoic indifference under capture.

The Waikato and Taranaki wars were undoubtedly the strivings of a people who found themselves beset by circumstances which demanded strong action. Just so long as Sir George Grey was capable of enforcing anti-liquor and similar acts in conjunction with personal power the trouble did not come to a head. When the Maori felt that he was being used as a milch cow by the whites he grew resentful. He was realizing fully the whole position. That his reasoning was faulty did not matter at the time. The threatened loss of land gave rise to strange mental outbursts. He started *Te Hokioi* (the name of a fabled bird of ill-omen) to be combated by Gorst's *Te Pihoihoi Mokemoke* (The Solitary Groundlark). To attempt to direct or inflame native opinion through a press indicates a good rate of progress in mental life when it is considered that the first printing of the Maori tongue was made by the C.M.S. preachers in 1835, only some thirty years earlier.

It was because of this facility in assimilation that the nucleus of the King movement was enabled to gather strength. No one who knows the history of our native tribes can do aught but wonder at the real philosophy underlying this attempt at unification, consciously-willed by sections essentially antagonistic for self-preservation against the aggressive *pakeha* (white). That the native had ability to propound a sound argument from a "white" premise is illustrated by the fact that when Bishop Selwyn visited *Wiremu Tamihana* (the King maker) both preached a sermon from the text: "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." *Wiremu*, at the morning service, advanced the text as a basis for a complete rejection of all things alien: it was an argument for the continuance of the autonomous settlement complete with schools, courts, parliament and newspaper!—the outward trappings, at least, of civilization. Selwyn, who preached in the evening, used the text as the basis for amity between the white people and the brown!

The war which followed was, in part, due to the old Polynesian trick of taking meaning from some aphorism. Grey mentioned that he would dig about the King until he fell. As bridges and roads came to be built the phrase was remembered and so the campaign was hastened. Not yet had the native learned the trick of thought which is essentially metaphorical, yet his own language abounds with phrases of a like kind. The close association of few words and instant action in the *pakeha* was essentially antithetical to the way of

the native who talked long and earnestly only to accomplish little in action.

It has been noticed, in passing, that Bishop Selwyn was hurt at the apostasy of so many natives. The natural swing was to savage cults and societies—a form hitherto not known. The cult of *Hau Hau-ism*, that of *Te Whiti*, later the *Ringa-tu*—these were but the strivings of a savage people to find a middle course. Of *Hau Hau-ism* the strongest supporter of the Maori can say no good ; but it was the mental result of his contact. Christianity had not done all he expected. To him it had proved a broken reed. The old cult of *Io* could no longer be advanced, for its *tapus* and ordinances had been proved false to those who gave it any serious thought. We thus find self-assertive groups evolving new cults. In such communities as then existed it was but natural that any form definitely and explicitly designed to elevate the native and consequently reduce the white in the affected areas was likely to secure many adherents.

There can be little doubt that each and every cult brought some measure of mental ease to a section of the people. It did not dabble in dogma requiring deep philosophic thought, yet it had sufficient mysticism to bring satisfaction to the sensitive native mind. It was, in short, a first step out of the old world of complex esoteric faith into one of simple exoteric beliefs. Whether the cult involved savage butchery or a policy of non-resistance, its tenets were a mixture of imagery and Christianity. What is more, with those groups wherein the beliefs still exist, the simple faith in the *mélange* of heathen and modern dogma is remarkably firm.

When force of arms brought peace the Western Maori stood upon the smoking ruins of his former lands. Confiscation brought introversion. The Eastern Maoris, who had loyally supported the whites, began to set their house in order. The essentials were education and land retention. "Although you can never be like us, be as like us as you're able to be" was not written then, but it was the motto of those who guided their destinies. Major Ropata Wahawaha who had fought on our side in Tuhoe had learned that the future well-being of his people depended not so much on superficial accomplishments, as on a true assimilation of white culture. That this could come only gradually out of the old was his belief. By the use of his personal power he set out to direct his people. In turn this direction was handed over by the tribe to Paratene Ngata. Upon his death, the organization of the people's will was so developed that they sought one who would carry on the work which was bringing not only happiness but also prosperity to them. Apirana Ngata was the one upon whom their choice fell. How he has succeeded is now well known. After a career at a University, followed by a term as a practising

solicitor, he returned to help his people. Today he holds a unique position. As a representative of the native people in the Cabinet of the House of Representatives he is acting Attorney-General for this Dominion. But he realizes, as do others, that there is now no simple road to assimilation. The process of overcoming inter-tribal difficulties, of placation and amelioration, cannot be hurried. The majority of the people cannot be turned from old thought-attitudes into new ones in a short time. There are some leaders whose rights to leadership are founded upon a new basis. They are the opportunists who have usurped power—the *nouveau-riches* of Maoridom. These, indeed, for their own ends would like to perpetuate the vestiges of the old culture yet remaining. It is only as the people awake to the new relationship that the true leader can take the proper stand. Slowly did the Eastern peoples realize this, and so it was not until the efforts of the late Sir Maui Pomare, Te Puea and similar leaders showed that the best assistance could come from the Maori himself that a change came about.

Thus we find the Maori of today race conscious. His wounds are not all healed, yet he realizes that the social organization and European thought that he so desired, must be a destructive force unless its inner philosophy is acquired. The way to the fulfilment of this end is not the casting aside of all his past, but rather careful pruning and judicious additions as policy and advancement may dictate.

He is starting off afresh now, not humbly or as one of a subservient race, but as one seized with the importance of making haste slowly. For that reason he hears singly the voice of his own people. The silver-tongued orator must demonstrate clearly that the line of thought is through the evolution of Maori thought, that sociality is to be advanced through present lines of organization, that new movements must be born within the race. Is it not amazing that a people should be willing to start afresh on such a basis? If the race can produce leaders of the right calibre, and the writer cannot see any reason why it should not, then progress is assured. Our colleges, universities and similar institutions have members of the native race. Their mentality is rated highly, they compare favourably with the European students; if they are able to direct, in part, the affairs of their own people the future of the Maori need cause us no misgiving.

But is the Maori to remain a race within a race; or is he destined to be absorbed by the white? Can the hatchet be buried deep enough between peoples of the north, south, east and west to make a united people? Will the future bring conflict of a more difficult type—the struggle that comes when two peoples of different, yet strong, mentalities strive for mastery in the world of agriculture, of economics, of law, of

sport? Signs are not wanting that success can be attained along these lines by the Maori. Like Icarus, he has tempted forbidden skies and hoped above the clouds on waxen plumes to rise. There can be given no answer to the questions that present themselves. We stand astonished at what he has accomplished; to evaluate such progress in terms of futurity, when guided by the resurrected power of his own people, is but futile. The past is gone, his bitter loss was but a finer gain for with it came, through fire and blood, the realization of a dynamic sociality involving an ever-changing, ever-advancing mental life in conflict with his own racial *mneme*.

EXPLANATION.[1]

By H. Tasman Lovell,
Professor of Psychology, University of Sydney.

The thesis of this paper maintains that *to explain is to relate appropriately.* A thing to be explained may be regarded as having both *genesis* and *existence.* Genetically, it is an *event*; existentially, it is a *fact.* If this distinction be permitted, it can be said that (*a*) we explain an event when we connect it with its true cause, and (*b*) we explain a fact when we connect it with its appropriate system of established knowledge. Of an event we ask: "How did it come to exist?" Of an existent fact we ask: "What is the system of established knowledge in which it participates?"

The result of connecting an event with its true cause, and of connecting a fact with its appropriate system of established knowledge, is to *reveal the meaning* of the event or fact. The meaning of an event for science is that it has resulted from certain causal conditions: for example, the expansion of a metal results from the application of heat to the metal. The meaning of a fact is the meaning of the system of established knowledge to which it belongs, the fact participates in that system and has its meaning in virtue of belonging to that system: for example, the system of established knowledge in physics which turns upon the idea of density, imparts the meaning "change of density" to the fact of expansion of a metal.

It would follow that the several terms, namely, "to make plain", "to render intelligible", "to understand", "to bring under", "to harmonize", which are used more or less loosely to express the purpose of explanation, all imply that meaning will be revealed through connection with a true cause, or with a system of established knowledge.

Now, a system of established knowledge itself results from the discovery of a true cause, otherwise it is not "established". For example, the system of established knowledge denoted by the term "microbial infection" became such a system for us only because it was discovered that microbes could infect organisms with a *virus.* Therefore it follows that to connect an event with its true cause is equivalent to connecting it as a fact with its appropriate system of

[1] Read before the Annual Congress of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, Melbourne, May, 1931.

established knowledge. For example, to explain the expansion of metals by referring to the application of heat to those metals, is equivalent to explaining that expansion by referring to the system of established knowledge about density. Or again, to explain a concrete case of anthrax by referring to the the activity of *Bacillus anthracis,* is equivalent to explaining the case of anthrax by referring to the system of established knowledge about microbial infection.

But the formulation of the discovered relation of cause to effect in any system of established knowledge is the statement of a *law.* Hence, to relate a fact to a law, in order to get explanation, is the same as relating that fact to its appropriate system of established knowledge, and the same, too, as relating that fact, as event, to its true cause. For example, the fact of a body falling is to be explained by reference to the system of established knowledge succinctly formulated in the law of gravitation, which is the same as referring it, as event, to its true cause, namely, that masses are exerting attraction upon each other. Or again, the fact that a planet is moving in an elliptical orbit is to be explained by reference to the combined systems of established knowledge succinctly formulated in the law of gravitation and in the law of centrifugal tendency, which is the same as referring the fact of planetary motion, as event, to its true cause, namely, the combined action of mass attraction and centrifugal tendency.

Next, since a law must be a fact or it is nothing at all, and since a law is the essence of a system of established knowledge, it follows that to explain a less general law by a more general law is the same as to relate a fact to a law, the same, too, as to relate a fact to its appropriate system of established knowledge, and the same as to relate that fact, as event, to its true cause. For example, Kepler's three less general and more empirical laws of planetary motion[1] receive their explanation by reference to Newton's more general law of gravitation. Kepler's three less general laws may be regarded as facts, receiving their explanation by reference to a law, by reference to their appropriate system of established knowledge, or by being referred, as events, to their true cause.

Now, it is true that all systems of knowledge are not scientific in the strict sense of the word. Some systems of

---

[1] (*a*) The orbit of each planet is an ellipse, with the sun at the focus of the curve. (*b*) The radius vector (*i.e.*, the line connecting the planet with the sun) passes over equal areas in equal times. (*c*) If the time required by any planet to complete a revolution in its orbit is called its "period", then the squares of the planetary periods are proportional to the cubes of their average distances from the sun. Moulton, F. R., *Introduction to Astronomy,* Revised Edition, page 229.

knowledge are not established systems in the sense that a true cause has been found for them. There are, then, in existence so-called systems of knowledge to which the reference of a fact will not mean relating it, as event, to its true cause. By that act of reference, however, the fact will be shown to participate in whatever meaning is characteristic of the so-called system of knowledge concerned. The meaning ascribed to the fact by that act of reference will be imperfect or false in consequence, and the explanation given will be inadequate or wrong. The attempt of scientists to explain a thing by classification, that is, by relating that thing to its class, tends to be thus limited in the less advanced sciences. To explain by *class* is to connect the species with its genus, the part with the whole. The result of this connecting is, again, to reveal meaning; for the meaning or characteristics of the whole belong also to the part, if it is to be a part of that whole at all: that is, the species participates in the meaning of the genus. There is, then, a kind of explanation by class. This explanation by class will be more or less adequate according as the classification is or is not based upon a true cause. As it is difficult to get a perfect classification, so explanation by class tends to be imperfect explanation.

In explanation by class the major premiss is constituted of the definition of the genus; in explanation by law and cause the major premiss is constituted of the causal generalization which is the essence of a system of established knowledge. While explanation is diagnostic, telling what a thing is, prediction is prognostic, telling what it will be. To have explanation the minor premiss must state the relevant characteristics of the thing to be explained. This statement of the relevant characteristics of the thing to be explained shows that it belongs to the genus, or to the system of established knowledge, or is conditioned in a certain way. To have prediction the minor premiss must state that the thing is a member of the class, or that it belongs to the system of established knowledge, or that it is the effect of a certain cause. Then we can say what characteristics it will have, how it will behave, or how it can be produced.

As for other systems of knowledge to which facts are referred for explanation, the only ones left are those governed by subjective considerations. Such systems may be true in part; they may also be quite false, even superstitious. They are not established or scientific systems, but subjective ones, and quite inadequate for the purposes of scientific explanation. Examples of such false subjective systems are: astrology, phrenology, palmistry, oneirology and spiritism, all of which

seem rather to specialize in prediction, possibly because they are so feeble in explanation. Another instance of such a false subjective system is that of magic by which primitive man attempts to explain phenomena.

From Aristotle we have it that there can be explanation by class, by law, by cause and by end. We have discussed explanation by class, by law, and by cause. There remains to be considered explanation by *end*. Here, again, to explain is to connect appropriately. For, if we are to explain by end, we must connect the fact, as event, with the purpose from which it issued. This is explanation by reference to the *final cause* rather than to the *efficient cause,* or teleological explanation. Since teleological explanation was formerly so much abused through the explainer drawing upon his imagination rather than inferring from fact without prejudice, and since the scientist, until recently, had been able to see no evidence of purpose in the events which he attempted to explain, science tended strictly to exclude teleological explanation in favour of mechanistic explanation, or explanation by efficient causes. Now, however, the most definitely mechanistic of the sciences, physical science, may be said to have opened the way again for teleological explanation, through its discovery of a factor of indeterminacy.

Still more in biology does mechanistic explanation tend to prove inadequate so that recourse must be had to teleological explanation. For example, the distinguished researches of H. S. Jennings into the behaviour of lower organisms[1] have shown that the principle of tropisms, as advocated by Verworn and Loeb, is not adequate to the explanation of much of the behaviour of lowly organisms. Jennings has shown that the reaction of these organisms is determined not by the direction from which the stimulus comes but by the differentiations of the animal's body. The reaction is occasioned by the stimulus, but the nature of the reaction is determined by an internal factor, so that the orientation of these creatures for purposes of adjustment is determined from within and not from without. It is indeed difficult to refrain from ascribing some kind of purposiveness to the behaviour of the amœbæ observed by Jennings[2] as they pursued and attempted to engulf other smaller amœbæ or parts of amœbæ, which, in their turn, exerted themselves to escape. The same apparent purposiveness is seen in the behaviour of stentor when submitted to an injurious stimulus.[3]

---

[1] "Contributions to the Study of the Behaviour of Lower Organisms," *Carnegie Institute of Washington Publications,* 16.
[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 199-202.
[3] *American Journal of Physiology,* Vol. 8, pp. 23-60.

Again, how is mechanism to explain the differential susceptibility in the axial gradient, so clearly established by Child in his experiments upon planarians, by which it has been shown that the head end is dominant over the lower aspects of the gradient.[1]

Similar strange adjusting forces are indicated by the principle of *neurobiotaxis* of Ariens Kappers[2] whereby neurones come into closer association for functional purposes, or by the principle of *cytoclesis* mentioned by Wood Jones,[3] a case of which is the way in which cells of the periphery become the transparent cornea when the outgrowing eye of the embryo approaches them, a change which has been known to take place when, experimentally, the eye of a tadpole has been made to grow out to the abdominal surface, proving that the supervening transparency does not result from a change conditioned in the peripheral cells themselves but from what Wood Jones designates "the call of cell to cell".

This hidden purposiveness is very notably displayed in the case of the newt's eye.[4] The lens was removed from the eye of a newt. Were the result to have been merely the healing of the wound caused by the operation, the mechanistic principle would suffice for the explanation of what eventuated. In fact, however, a new lens grew, and that, too, from tissue different from that from which the original lens had come. It would almost appear as if the organism as a whole, or the cells immediately concerned, understood the meaning of the situation, namely, that a new lens was needed. At any rate, there was a response to the meaning of the situation which could not be explained by the principle of mechanism. Even the principle of vitalism does not seem equal to the task of explaining this surprising result. Hence one is driven to support the principle of "organicism", advanced by Julian Huxley[5] in order to account for the curious biological events which seem quite beyond the capacity of mechanism or vitalism to explain. The whole organism seems to be active in its parts; it seems, in short, to react to situations with a kind of organic memory, or *mneme*. The characteristics of the cells are in some way caught up in the whole organism of which they are a part, and the history of the cells and the evolved

---

[1] Charles Manning Child: "The Origin and Development of the Nervous System," University of Chicago Press, 1921, Chapter V.

[2] *Cunningham's Text-Book of Anatomy* (Fifth Edition), Oxford Medical Publications, p. 555.

[3] Wood Jones and Porteous: *The Matrix of the Mind*, Honolulu, 1928, p. 35 and pp. 50-51.

[4] Professor W. E. Agar: *Mechanism and Vitalism in Biology*, Presidential Address, Section N, Report of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, Brisbane, 1930.

[5] H. G. Wells, Julian S. Huxley and G. P. Wells: *The Science of Life*, 1929.

organism seems to have been stored up to provide what appears to be almost an intelligent response made in the light of past experience.

In psychology, where purpose is obviously a causal factor, where purposes become causes through their conative impulses and through their intelligent formulation of plans for the realisation of those conations, a good deal of room has to be made for teleological explanation. Some psychologists, impressed by what the biologist has revealed, advance the conception of *hormé*[1] to explain the inherent purposiveness of organisms, a purposiveness which is active from the outset in the cell itself before ever self-consciousness appears at all. It is little wonder, then, that men are now speaking freely of the existence of "consciousness" in the cell itself. How far this way of speaking brings us from the psychologists who used to assume that consciousness was related only to cortical activity! And how interesting, in this connection, is it to note the priority over matter which the great modern physicists are giving to consciousness! Eddington has even asserted that consciousness is to be found in the atom.

The Gestalt psychology of Köhler[2] and Koffka[3] with its emphasis on the influence of wholes upon perception, points in the same direction and is analogous to the organicism of Julian Huxley in biology.

Finally, the principle of *Holism*,[4] advanced by General Smuts, completes the progress of this idea by carrying it into the domain of philosophical explanation itself.

From teleological explanation it is but a step to the vexed question of human freedom. In spite of the strong case which can be advanced for a pervading purposiveness in all living things, when a human being acts from conation considered as the activity of a need, he is not free, but is being determined by the structural nature of the native or acquired tendency, the instinct or habit from which the conation issues. It is here still a *vis a tergo* which is the determinant of action, even though that *vis a tergo* is an internal and not an external condition of activity. A sufficient explanation of the action can be found in the conditions, phylogenetic and ontogenetic, which gave rise to it: the external stimulus is but the occasion of the action, not its cause. But when the intelligent awareness of self-consciousness came to be evolved, the meaning of things and activities came to be understood in relation to the

---

[1] T. P. Nunn: *Education: Its Data and First Principles*, p. 21. William McDougall: *An Outline of Psychology*, Melbourne, 1923, p. 71.
[2] Wolfgang Köhler: *Gestalt Psychology*, London, G. Bell & Son, 1930.
[3] Kurt Koffka: *The Growth of the Mind*, Kegan Paul, 1925.
[4] Jan Christiaan Smuts: *Holism and Evolution*, Macmillan, 1927.

self and its prospects. Thus, while the great background of structural determination remains within the organism to prevent man from being wholly free, yet the grasp of true meaning introduces *a new cause* among the so-called natural causes already existing. This comprehension of the meanings of things in a self-conscious way, makes man a cause in a new sense, and so opens the door to freedom. Structurally, he is a cause without being aware of the fact—just one of the many other so-called natural causes; but with the self-conscious grasp of true meaning he becomes aware of being a cause, and that is the source of his feeling of freedom. In that degree in which he truly understands and can control situations and things, he becomes a free agent. Freedom, then, is possible, but only to those who live by the truth. Since truth itself is difficult to attain, and since living by the truth when it is known is also difficult because of the continued impulsion from structure, man can hope for only a relative freedom: his degree of freedom will depend upon his degree of intelligence, his diligence in the pursuit of truth, his submission to truth when he has attained it, and his practice in living by the truth which he knows.

At least it can be said, perhaps, that man becomes a cause through his enlightened purposes, and that teleological explanation seems to be so far in place.

If now one were to ask: "But what is truth?", I should like to refer to the exposition of it given by my colleague, Professor John Anderson, of the University of Sydney.[1] For him, the truth is the "state of affairs" as it in fact is, or "what is the case". With this one must agree. But when he goes on to contend that the proposition *is* the state of affairs; when he asserts that the proposition does not merely represent the state of affairs, or formulate it, or correspond to it; when he asserts that "you cannot get behind the proposition", I find it impossible to agree with his exposition of what constitutes "truth". The main objection which presents itself is this: If all propositions are actually states of affairs, then all propositions must necessarily be true: no proposition can conceivably be false, so that there is no way of dealing with the problem of error. If Professor Anderson answers that one can deal with the problem of error by discarding a proposition "when our faculties tell us that it is false", then I should contend that he has given away his case for the proposition by admitting that there has been a proposition which was not a state of affairs. This is not to mention the

[1] *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, Vol. V, No. 4.

other objection that one who makes strict logic the only criterion of thinking has resorted to a purely pragmatic escape from the difficulty presented by the problem of error.

Professor Anderson's exposition also commits one to an identification of *being* and *knowing*: *to be* is the same as *to be known,* and *to be known* is the same as to be. *Esse,* after all, *ist percipi.* It would seem to be wrong to identify existence with truth so absolutely just because men do *sometimes* formulate truthfully the existing state of affairs. If men *always* formulated truthfully the existing state of affairs one might perhaps forgive the identification of *being* and *knowing,* though even then it would not be possible without begging the question.

Truth is rather a correct formulation of the conditions of being or existence. Existence is neither true nor false; it just *is.* The proposition is a human formulation of the state of existence, and may therefore be correct or incorrect, true or false. One still feels that, in spite of the bogey of the "infinite regress", one cannot abandon the correspondence theory of truth, which does give a clear explanation of the problem of error, in favour of Professor Anderson's uncompromising empiricism which cannot explain error.

It might be contended that inductive procedure also contributes to explanation, and that my account concerns only deduction. It must be admitted that in the wide sense inductive procedure does contribute to explanation. However, for the purpose of this paper I have preferred to take a restricted view of the act of explaining, a view which presupposes that a true cause has already been found or a system of knowledge already established.

In conclusion, the scientist in an ecstasy of modesty claims that he never *explains* anything, that he only more and more adequately *describes.* This modest view of his labours is only justified if the term "explanation" is reserved for ultimate explanation. By why so reserve it when ultimate explanations are not forthcoming? Did we so reserve it, we should be wrong in speaking of explanation at all, except as a hope or a possibility. That would be at variance with usage. As a matter of fact, do we not have progressive explanation which is more than description? Is not description of the nature of an inventory while explanation is of the nature of enlightenment? Is not the distinction between description and explanation the same as that which seems to exist between induction by simple enumeration and induction by the discovery of a true cause, between knowing that a thing is so and knowing how it came to be so?

DISCUSSION.

INDIVIDUALITY.

I.

In the last number of the Journal—No. 2, Vol. IX—Professor W. Anderson takes me to task for some statements of mine in the *Auckland Star* of 4th May, 1931.

I do not desire to enter into such a discussion as Professor Anderson invites, firstly because I am far too busy with my day-to-day duties, secondly because I am not a dialectician of sufficient parts to cross swords with such a doughty protagonist, and thirdly because I am not very sure where he and I differ sufficiently on any matter of practical import to carry on anything but a "sham-fight."

Really I cannot see what all the fuss is about. Speaking *ex tempore* at a public meeting of our local branch of the Association, I made use of the words quoted by Professor Anderson. So far as my recollection serves me, they are an exceptionally accurate report of what was said and, *horrible dictu,* I stick by them.

From these apparently innocent remarks Professor Anderson draws a battery of inferences, not one of which, considering the circumstances in which the statements were made, appears to me legitimate. He further makes the occasion one on which to mount his hobby—uncharitable people might call it by another name—individuality, a term I did not employ, and a concept I did not infer. I was referring to the pedagogical treatment of the exceptional child and made it clear that where 50 or 60 or even more children were gathered together under one teacher, the measure of special attention which, Professor Anderson notwithstanding, is necessary could not be given.

I am indicted on five counts. Let me give my defence.

1. "Professor Gould identifies individuality with difference or 'unlikeness'."

I do nothing of the kind. I spoke of the "individual child" and meant, and was understood to mean, the particular child. I said that no two children were alike and because of the differences, in some cases as wide as the poles, they called for a measure of unequal treatment. Does Professor Anderson deny this?

If he chooses to infer from this his fifth indictment, "that the extent of possible 'uniformity' in education is measured by

the antecedent uniformity there is in the children," he may; but I do not think he may fairly do so. I had rather he drew the inference intended, that the genius and the imbecile require unequal pedagogical treatment.

2. "He implies that individuality is a datum to be operated upon, not a value to be achieved."

I think no one can logically draw this inference from my remarks. As a matter of fact, and so far as the teacher in the classroom is concerned, individuality is both a datum to be operated on and an end to be progressively achieved. The child comes to school an individual, the product of his hereditary equipment and the environmental influences of his home and "street". The teacher may ignore this fact, as Professor Anderson seems to imply that he should. If he does, I am afraid he will not get very far before he suffers a rude awakening.

3. "He postulates an inverse ratio between what is individual to man and what is common to man."

Surely this is a far-fetched inference from my remarks, an inference that only one spoiling for a fight would draw. Is it fair? Did my audience infer it? It was my audience, and not Professor Anderson, that I was speaking to. That audience was not a gathering of professors of philosophy, but of real, flesh-and-blood people who placed a common-sense interpretation on a common-sense statement.

It may not be impertinent at this point to recall the jest of La Bruyère—"The philosopher has always been too interested in himself to penetrate the minds of those about him."

4. "Would Professor Gould say that when, for example, a large class of students is carried to a higher or more intense state of comprehension of the same subject under the influence of an inspiring lecture, their several individualities are *pro tanto* diminished or neglected?"

No, he would not; nor do his reported remarks justify the inference that he would.

5. "Professor Gould maintains that the extent of possible 'uniformity' in education is measured by the antecedent amount of uniformity there is in the children."

I confess this is a possible inference, but I assure Professor Anderson it was not an intended inference from the second paragraph of the newspaper report. No doubt "in the interests of clear thinking" I should have considered all the possible inferences, and have become tongue-tied. Few, I think, besides Professor Anderson would draw the inference that he does. I feel sure my audience did not. They understood me to mean

precisely what I meant, and what the whole of the preceding discussion made perfectly clear, that children of varying capacities and interests cannot rightly be taught wholly *en masse*. This, as every teacher knows, whatever be his philosophy, is a bedrock fact.

Try as I will, I cannot see wherein I have erred. I may not have confined myself to the usage of terms as sanctified by the philosophy of Professor Anderson. For this I offer no apology. I desired to impress upon my audience the necessity for more adequate provision for the education of the exceptional child, and chose a medium of communication that they would understand. My practical purpose, to say nothing of the dictates of common sense and politeness, demanded that I should.

W. H. GOULD.

II.

How prone we are to forget the fact that as individuals and in groups we live in different worlds of thought and feeling. Even those of us who have considered that fact and the importance of dealing with others in the light of that fact. How prone we are to forget it. Here is an instance: In the June issue of the Journal, Professor W. Anderson criticised certain remarks made by Professor W. H. Gould, Professor of Education, Victoria College, Wellington. The remarks as reported in a local newspaper are given in the Journal. A first reading of Professor Anderson's criticism left me bewildered and indignant. It appeared to me, as I suppose it would to any educationist, both unjustified and irrelevant. Later, I came to see Professor Anderson's point of view.

Professor Gould, in the remarks quoted, urged the right of the child to be treated by his teacher as an individual and not as a mere class-unit. Also that while group-teaching is desirable at times, provision should be made for individual teaching when necessary, especially in the case of backward children. These are facts which would appear to be self-evident, but, as Professor Gould found it necessary to restate them, perhaps I may be permitted to add that, when placed in a class of children of average ability or, in some cases, of more than average ability, backward children are humiliated and discouraged and are thereby made unable to use what intelligence they do possess, and so sustain positive injury. The more gifted children in the class do not escape injury, moral injury: they tend to become impatient, and scornful of the less gifted children in the class.

The phrase "individual child" used with perfect propriety by Professor Gould, an educationist discussing an educational problem, was heard (or read) by Professor Anderson as a philosopher strongly interested in individualism. Professor Anderson's attack on Professor Gould's remarks was unjustified, but so also was my hasty indignation at that attack. Both errors sprang from the same root; namely, forgetfulness of the fact that philosophers and educationists, like other people, live in different worlds of thought and feeling.

MARY COCHRAN.

REVIEWS.

RELIGION AND LIFE: The William Belden Noble Lectures, delivered in Harvard University, 1930, by W. B. Selbie, M.A., D.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. Humphrey Milford, London. Pp. 132. Price: 6s. net.

Is man's religious life purely subjective in its origin and effects, a thing of his own creation, a kind of spider-web spun out of his own entrails? or has it some objective validity? and if so, what is its proper relation to the rest of his life? These are living questions today among thoughtful people, religious and anti-religious: and they may be said to constitute the central interest around which the discussion in this book moves. The author does not announce them as his starting point, but they emerge to some degree in every chapter. He treats them with candour, the clearness of competent scholarship and the confidence of experience and conviction, but without dogmatism. His declared aim is "to give a simple and summary interpretation of religion in its relation to the life and thought of men under modern conditions". It is a small book with a wide range. It contains numerous references to larger works with more technical treatment, but has over them this advantage at least, that the reader may here all the time see the wood and need not get lost among the trees.

The subject is treated under six headings: Religion and History, The Psychological Interpretation of Religion, Belief in God, Religion and Ethics, The Christian Contribution, and Eternal Life.

Religion is not defined. It is admitted that from its very nature it may be indefinable. However, the first chapter gives a bird's-eye view of those human activities manifest throughout history and usually classed under the term religion. Some of the latest efforts to discover and describe what is essentially distinctive of such phenomena are illustrated. This conclusion is reached: Any purely subjective interpretation of religion is insufficient. Even on the emotional side the working of the religious impulse is often in direct opposition to the normal suggestions of man's nature. Religion cannot be accounted for by the action of any one instinct to the exclusion of others. It rather represents man's total reaction to the universe. There is in it something *sui generis*, which in the long run makes for life and progress in the individual and in society. It is indefinable in the sense that it cannot be interpreted in terms of any other power or faculty of our being, but only by and through itself.

The interpretation of religion from the psychological standpoint clears much ground, and lays bare, but does not solve, the question of the objective validity of religious experience. Psychology is a science concerned with mental processes, and has its limits. It often happens that when science makes some distinct advance with a new theory or method, many are lured to claim more for the new thing than can be justified. Psychology has

done much to elucidate the mental processes accompanying religious experience, in which the religious subject discovers what he calls the grace of God, even while he admits that it "passeth understanding". But when it is argued that "we may look forward to a day when psychology will have proved that there is no more need for the grace of God to explain conversion than of Jupiter to explain thunder", there is a complete misunderstanding of the province of psychology and a blindness to the issues. Analysis of the processes of religious experience can no more explain religion than dissection of a body can explain life. The central mystery, the problem of the ultimate cause and issues, remains when psychology has done its best or worst. The question of the reality of the object of religious experience is on all fours with the problem of the reality of the objective world. If one is a legitimate inference from experience, so is the other. If the real is the rational, religion has at least a *prima facie* justification for her claim to be in touch with reality.

In the chapter on Belief in God the specific messages of Julian Huxley, Middleton Murray and Walter Lipmann are briefly characterized, and also the modern mechanistic outlook. Even the dimmest gropings of man after God have been not wholly spontaneous. The belief in a revealed will and guiding hand of God has been a constant factor in religious progress, and has grown with man's intellectual and spiritual development. Historically the greatest thing in religion is prophecy—not prediction, but interpretation and criticism of life in the name of God. And the core of prophecy is a "Thus saith the Lord". It is unintelligible save on the basis of something given, startling the soul to new knowledge and fuller life, fitting itself to man's ignorance and leading him on towards the light. Faith, in which communion with God is realized, is compounded of belief and trust. It is both intellectual and conative, and its motto as it moves forward is *solvitur ambulando*.

For morality it is difficult to find a basis. The ultimate basis must be religion. There is ethical power in the religion of Jesus, whose teaching has to do first and last with character and the conduct of life. Its centre and essence is his doctrine of man, which has its root in his doctrine of God as Father. His gospel brings hope and power. He appeals to the moral sense of men, and it responds and rises to a new manhood rooted in a trust in and obedience to the will of God. In interpreting moral evil as sin, Christianity affirms the close relation of ethics and religion; and in showing the remedy even for sin, it proves to be a dynamic as well as a direction. But its gospel is to be interpreted not merely in terms of rescue and deliverance, but positively in terms of new life of personal holiness and service to others.

The Christian contribution to life flows from the essence of Christianity, which is to be found especially in the new valuations of God and man which Jesus has made. These are as leaven, slowly leavening the whole lump of humanity. They have abolished slavery under the Christian flag, and emancipated woman. They are destined to abolish war and class warfare, too. Opponents of Christianity never made a greater mistake than when they characterized it is as dope.

The last chapter presents an argument for eternal life. This is a question not merely of continuation but of quality of life. The argument rests on the reality of the highest values. These are not self-subsistent things, but experiences of conscious minds. Man is organic to the universe; it is not reasonable to suppose that his long and intricate developmental process ceases when his body fails. He has reached the appreciation and apprehension of eternal values. It is unthinkable that the power which has produced him and them, and in which they together subsist, should suffer them to perish. It is unthinkable that man's fate should be like that of "oyster-shells at a banquet, whisked from the table to make room for the next course".

J. EDWARDS.

GENETIC STUDIES OF GENIUS. VOL. III: THE PROMISE OF YOUTH. Edited by Lewis M. Terman. Stanford University Press and Geo. Harrap & Co. Ltd. 1930.

Over fifteen years ago Professor Terman projected the application of the Stanford Binet Tests to the problem of sorting out the brightest youthful intellects of his district. For over twelve years he has dedicated—the word is used deliberately—portion of his regular salary to an extension of the research. Public and private benefactions added their portion to the original fund and so have made possible the prosecution of the work. The records of the research so conducted have, from time to time, appeared in the three volumes of the series of "Genetic Studies". The first gave details of the mental and physical traits of one thousand gifted children; the second delved into the biographical records of three hundred world-famous geniuses; and the third, the present study under review, is largely a follow-up record of the children whose original data are contained in the first volume.

The information sought by the investigators covers not only an answer to the problem of "how gifted children turn out", but includes inquiries into the mental status of their siblings, reports upon the selected children from parents and teachers, and personality tests and special tests of various kinds. Records of control groups are added to afford a necessary basis of comparison.

On the educational side the group of gifted children tend to show out well in English, Literature, History, Mathematics, and Science. The tests used were educational scales of achievement in these subjects. Their average scores amounted on the whole to above 1·5 S.D. of the mean of the control group. There is one interesting exception, however, in the matter of the Equation and Formula section of the "Algebra" scale, in which the gifted group's achievement was only equal to that of the control group. But in the section involving Problem Solution in the same test the results were again above those of the control group. Obviously the reader may conclude that a special ability is operative in regard to aptitude in work with algebraic expressions. Naturally such gifted children graduate earlier from high schools than the control group. They yet contrive to do more than hold their own in competition with their fellows despite this age handicap, as their "distinction" awards and *Phi Beta Kappa* membership records show.

In an inquiry into general interests decided sex preferences appear. The girls show a liking for Art, English and modern languages, and a dislike for Mathematics. Boys, on the other hand, tend to prefer Science and to dislike ancient languages. Both sexes select reading as the chief leisure occupation, athletics coming second. In their vocational interests over four-fifths had planned to enter one of the professions.

One general source of error that is as common among teachers as laymen is the confusion of the idea of "mental age" with "chronological age". The gifted child, on account of his more precocious development, is generally promoted to a class group which is mainly comprised of his seniors in chronological age. None or little credit is, however, accorded him by his teachers for his performances, simply because he does not outshine his older competitors. It is comforting to note that this misconception or ignorance is to be found in such a State as California, where Terman's influence must be strongest and psychology almost a hackneyed term, as well as in our own country where psychological knowledge and interest are necessarily more limited.

In certain cases re-tests of intelligence were made. Results show that the mean I.Qs. of a group of thirty-eight boys have dropped on the average three points, and those of a group of thirty-five girls thirteen points. For subjects too old to test by the Stanford Binet, the Terman Group Test was used; in this the scores of the boys consistently exceeded those of the girls. The conclusion arrived at from this result is that this "change-of-rate" principle in individuals is concerned with sex factors, "boys being more

likely than girls to have a high I.Q. as they advance in age, but they are more likely than girls to retain a high I.Q. earlier evidenced" (p. 62).

Personality traits have long withstood the attacks of psychologists who have sought to reduce them to commensurable terms by means of tests. However, of the best of these that are available, Professor Terman has chosen and utilized a selection in his present study. On the whole the gifted group show a ready response to school discipline, a minimum of sex difficulties, and, in general, half the proportion of personality problems of those found among the control group. The frequent claim of the layman that genius implies "queerness" or temperamental instability is obviously untrue in their cases. In regard to parents' and teachers' ratings the traits of "originality, initiative and intelligence" are outstanding and in marked contrast to the comparatively low estimates of "leadership". It is a matter for regret that this last quality is not exhibited in greater measure if these gifted individuals are to influence their fellows. At the same time it is to be borne in mind that they are chronologically younger than their associates and lacking in the prestige of years, so that the present estimate may not necessarily be correct when these individuals mature in these qualities. At the same time it is also to be borne in mind that one quality does not necessarily imply the possession of others, and leadership and intelligence belong to unrelated and different groups of traits, the former to temperamental drives or urges, the latter to aptitudes or capacities.

Inquiry into family relationships of the gifted groups shows a high proportion of gifted parents and siblings, the latter not being so outstanding as members of the group itself, yet ranking at a "superior" level of intelligence. Over ninety per cent. of the gifted group have gone on or have planned to proceed to college, and all but two have graduated from the high school. Approximately fifty per cent. of each sex graduating from college have taken up post-graduate work. The majority of these have decided for a profession and the remainder for a business career.

The second part of the volume deals with special case studies. Of most of these it is impossible here to treat in detail. Their chief interest lies in the fact that the promise shown in early development has received fulfilment in maturity. Especially is their work of interest in the field of literature. In comparison with the "*juvenilia*" of acknowledged geniuses, the work of seven of this special literary section of the gifted group shows achievement and promise equal to the latter. Three reliable judges of accepted standing in literary criticism rated the work of the group and the distinguished "controls". Most of the work so adjudicated on has been reproduced and the reader may draw his own conclusions. One final note of extreme importance is that in relation to a control group of talented individuals in art, literature, and music. These individuals lacked high intelligence. Their results have shown a disappointing falling off in final achievement in their maturity. Such results support the original contention of Terman that special ability, unsupported by outstanding intelligence, fails to achieve anything beyond mediocrity. The converse is probably also true that, without special talents, a high general intelligence level will fail to achieve outstanding distinction in a given field. Hence, it is not only essential to test children for general capacity, but for special aptitudes as well.

To all interested in the subject of psychology this volume must hold especial interest; to those specifically engaged in the work of mental testing the work will afford direction and encouragement. To the community in general the work may fail perhaps to make a direct appeal. It will, however, remain as one of those epoch-making works which will influence the future. After all the work of Darwin was received coldly by many scientists and even aroused the wrath of contemporary conservative thinkers. But the concept of evolution infiltrated slowly among the lay population till today its truth is generally accepted if not popularly understood. The full significance of the work of Professor Terman in particular and his associates will probably only be fully appreciated fifty years hence. But among those

who understand what such patient and painstaking research entails their appreciation and admiration will be a matter of the present. In this work he has combined with a brilliant and magnificent conception of investigation, that final touch of genius which implies the "infinite capacity for taking pains". Next to his great master, Binet, Terman will rank among the great pioneers of the present movement in psychometrics.

A. H. MARTIN.

UN ANIMATEUR DE LA JEUNESSE AU XIII^e SIÈCLE. By Marguerite Aron. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie. 1930. Pp. 396. *Prix:* 20 *fr.*

This is the story of the life and work of Jourdain de Saxe, the great leader of the Dominican Order in the thirteenth century, and successor to its illustrious founder. Apart from the professional historian, there are at least three groups of people who should find much of interest in the volume, which is neither dry-as-dust history nor yet merely a popular story. It should attract the psychologist interested in the psychology of religion, for it is a mine of illustrations of the religious consciousness; it should be of great interest to the educationist who sends his students for inspiration to the history of education, for it is the story of one of the most enthusiastic and successful teachers of all time; thirdly, the ordinary educated man should find delight in its glimpses of life in a colourful time, particularly the life of University cities.

Vivid and very interesting are the pictures of the youthful University of Paris, with its young professors teaching enthusiastic youth from the few books which the teachers alone possessed, its teachers and students living together, throwing their meagre resources into a common pool, tending each other in times of illness, conspiring to defeat the mean ends of rapacious landlords, and, when that rapacity grew beyond bearing, going on strike, picking up sticks, and abandoning the ungrateful city to the Stygian blackness of ignorance. Oxford, struggling in its beginnings, received a great impetus from such a strike among Parisian students. A brawl between some students and the vulgar citizenry had resulted in the death of a few of the former. By way of punishment the students deserted *en masse* a city unworthy to be graced by their presence.

The main purpose of the book is to tell the story of the efforts of Jourdain to establish strongly the young Dominican Order. It is a story of indefatigable effort—of journey after perilous journey over all Europe, but mainly to the University cities. For two qualities Jourdain sought in all recruits, scholarship and youth. Marguerite Aron gives us the clearest of pictures of this tireless enthusiast and his fifteen years of service to the cause he loved. A man of charity this, and no long-mouthed ascetic, for though he called the students to a life of poverty and piety and educational service, he offered them at the same time the delights of scholarship and the joyousness that can be shared by none save those who serve. To be a Puritan he asked of none. On one occasion a companion of Jourdain would have rebuked with severity a batch of young recruits who were taking the vows with what appeared to him unseemly levity. Said Jourdain: "*Riez bien haut, très Chers, ne vous contraignez pas à cause de ce Frère—je vous en donne toute licence—vous avez bien raison de vous réjouir, et de rire.*" His own outstanding scholarship, his gift of perennial youthfulness which made him always contemporary at heart if not in years with the University students of Europe, his own attractive manliness—it was these that made possible his extraordinary record of 240 branches of the Order established in fifteen years, each branch with its learned professors, and each full of University trained men.

Pierre Mandonnet, who writes an introduction to the book, calls it "*une belle page d'histoire du plus beau siècle de l'Europe chrétienne*".

I have not the historical knowledge to comment upon Mandonnet's judgment of the thirteenth century, but this book of Aron's is certainly " a beautiful page of history ".

C. R. MORAN.

SOME SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA. Ed., F. J. C. Hearnshaw, M.A., LL.D. George G. Harrap & Co., London. 1931. Price: 7s. 6d. net.

This volume covers the period 1760–1820, and contains accounts of the more important political theorists of that time. The best thing in it, in my opinion, is the sketch of Jeremy Bentham by J. W. Allen. Professor Allen writes with admirable vigour and clarity, and gives a distinct and independent point for view; for example, he actively denies to Bentham that rather extravagant praise which many writers would give him. Professor Allen can see little reason to give Bentham all the credit for changes made afterwards in a Benthamite direction; in fact, I rather feel that he has gone too far in the other direction, and underestimated the effect of that acid criticism upon current evils. For the rest, Professor McElroy writes well of the Americans, and G. S. Veitch gives a vigorous sketch of Early English Radicals. This last is a well documented essay, and gives considerable information about such men as Sawbridge and Lofft, who are little known. Dr. Sykes and Mr. Driver have written workmanlike expositions of the ideas of Paine and Godwin, and, incidentally, they bring out well how closely these distrusted radicals approached to ideas which we now accept without question. H. J. Laski discusses in an interesting way the question of how far the French Revolution was Socialistic, and gives a useful account of Babeuf. Finally, Professor Atkins has written an interesting sketch of movements in German thought during the period.

Nevertheless, the book is a little disappointing, for it is not as good as a glance down the table of contents would suggest. This is partly because it consists of nine separate chapters by different authors, and suffers from the incoherence and variety of quality seen in most composite works. Again, the book appears to be a reprint of public and semi-popular lectures; and in lecturing there is a tendency to decline from the high ideal of scholarship—to clothe ideas in vague generalities, and to aim at lucidity even at the expense of precision. Especially I feel that the introduction is unworthy of much of the good work that follows. I do not find much value in casual comparisons between the French Revolution and the Italian Renaissance, and I do not think that a historian should go far out of his way to remark that " the things that do not exist are far more numerous than those that do ". The editor would, I think, have been better employed compiling an index, for the book deserves one.

F. L. WOOD.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CLASSROOM. By Charles Elmer Holley, Ph.D. Published by D. C. Heath & Co., U.S.A. 1930. Pp. xiii, 257. From George E. Harrap, London. Price: 6s.

The writing of books is an arduous and somewhat thankless task. Consequently it behoves the reviewer to comment upon what he finds good in any volume sent to him. Let me hasten then to write that the present work shows, in its general arrangement, a proper understanding of, and respect for, the interests of young students, that it contains many facts of value to student-teachers, and that the printer has done his part admirably.

We learn in the Preface that Dr. Holley, having agonized over standard textbooks of psychology during his own sojourn in a teachers' college, resolved to spare other student-teachers that agony by writing a textbook on psychology which would be pertinent to the problems of a teacher. The

aim is surely praiseworthy. Many standard textbooks of psychology are not particularly useful to the average teachers' college student.

But the book leaves this reader with the impression that its author, as a student, found theoretical psychology so distasteful that he can scarcely bring himself to write about it at all. It is one thing, and sensible, to omit theoretical topics of no interest to any but the academic psychologist; it is quite another, and much less sensible, to scorn theory almost to its entire neglect, and to show scant regard for accuracy and consistency in what little psychology is included. To take a definite example, the student would at once learn more psychology and gain fuller insight into the problems of the teacher by reading McDougall's "Social Psychology" than from however close a study of Holley's account of instincts, despite that Holley describes certain instincts—among others, those of *phantasy*, *attention*, and *mental activity*—which have never occurred to McDougall. A little of the despised theory might at this point dispel a lot of haziness. To be sure, Holley does refer his reader to McDougall, but, since he spells him MacDougal, one is obliged to doubt whether our author is very anxious that the student shall reach the suggested destination.

It is perhaps unfair to comment upon this misspelling of a name, however famous, and to suggest that it indicates a persistence of the author's youthful dislike for academic psychology. The comment would be omitted were there not many other inaccuracies and misstatements. Illustration of this last criticism is rendered dangerous by the warning that "no part of this book may be reproduced in any form or manner without permission in writing from the publisher". But a short example or two may be risked. In the discussion of the child's emotional reactions we read: "We cannot appeal to his reason, but instead, we must resort to incentives that are directed largely towards the emotional." One would have thought on the contrary, that to appeal to reason on every possible occasion, and such occasions are many, is the teacher's very solemn duty. Again we read: "Criticism, also, should be avoided because it leads only to negative results". The serious error here is not removed by the subsequent statement: "That is true especially if the criticism is destructive." In the chapter on "Abnormalities and Mental Hygiene" we come across the following interesting misstatement: "The great bulk of mental abnormalities that the teacher is likely to meet, especially those that are mild in character, is due to nurture." Besides being profoundly untrue, this expression of opinion has the further disadvantage of giving the lie to Holley's rather sound chapter on "Nature and Nurture".

In brief, the book contains too little psychology, and much of what is there is very unsound.

C. R. McRAE.

MYTHS AND LEGENDS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINALS. By W. Ramsay Smith, M.D., D.Sc. With Plates in Colour, by Alice Woodward. Geo. G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., London. 1930. Pp. 356. Price: 21s. net.

In this volume Dr. Ramsay Smith has collected a number of the principal mythological tales of the Australian natives, and from his long personal knowledge of these people he has been able to include much material not previously recorded. As a set of stories for the diversion of children and other non-scientific readers it fulfils its purpose admirably. Its claim to merit as an anthropological contribution, however, is small. The author often does not state from what part of the continent a story comes and leaves one uncertain whether different tribal versions have not been blended; his system of spelling of tribal names and other native terms is somewhat uncouth, and it is not made clear that the importance of many of the tales lies not in their interest as mere narrative, but in their association with sacred ritual in the light of which alone their significance can be properly

understood. Moreover, the author's contention that his reproduction of the myths truly portrays the native mode of expression and thought can hardly be maintained. Culture heroes and ancestral spirits have been metamorphosed into deities of a more abstract grandiloquent type, so that we meet "the Sun Mother", "the Goddess of Light and Life", "little fairy Good Spirit", and by contrast our old discredited acquaintance "the Evil One", none of whom ring true in an Australian mythology. And surely only to a native steeped in civilized teaching would such expressions as these, allegedly spoken by an aboriginal mother, be familiar: "Thy infant life of purity, nourished by a mother's love within thy innocent breast, would have expanded thy soul and mind and body in that mysterious land beyond the western sky. This is the grandest privilege to still-born infants untainted by worldly desire and sinful vice" (p. 310).

The myths have been intellectualized, presented in a setting of modern civilized ideas and moral principles to which they are often quite alien. Two further sample quotations will illustrate this: In the story of the creation the peewee narrates that after obtaining a mate, "we . . . sang together a song of praise to the Sun Goddess, the Mother of All Living Things, who had given us life and sustenance, and who had also endowed every living thing with the greatest of all gifts—the mutual longing for a kindred soul . . . " (p. 44). And in the tale of the origin of the Pleiades, "According to this story it was the girls who had reached the age of adolescence who perceived the necessity for bringing the body under subjection to the mind in order to restrain physical appetite and control the effects of pain and fear. They saw that without such control there would be no real racial advancement." (P. 345).

This will suffice to show the distortion of ideas which the myths have suffered in their transfer from the lips of the aboriginal narrator—a distortion which has gone far to spoil some excellent material.

RAYMOND FIRTH.

GROUNDWORK OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. By J. S. Ross, M.A., B.Sc. Harrap & Co. Pp. 276. Price: 5s. net.

There is already a small library of books which seek to apply to education the theories and findings of modern psychology. The special difficulty confronting the writer of such a book is that he has, as a rule, to address himself to students who are meeting the subject for the first time. He is consequently seeking to build up his science and to apply it at the same time. The result is that many books on educational psychology are little more than elementary text books on psychology with stress on topics and illustrations which have a bearing on school work. A radically different method of approach is that of Sandiford or Starch, who are chiefly concerned with giving facts culled from innumerable educational investigations. Both kinds of books have their place, and it may be that the best book for introductory purposes is the one giving a general point of view.

The present book is of the general type and is frankly based on the writings of Adams, Nunn, McDougall and Drever. The presentation is usually clear even when difficult concepts are being dealt with. The illustrations are often homely and effective. The book impresses one with its thoroughness and straightforwardness rather than its brilliance.

It may be questioned whether, for an introductory text, the book does not attempt too much in the way of an abstract analysis of mental life. For example, the second chapter on fundamental hypotheses logically comes at the beginning, but psychologically it comes at a much later stage of the student's interest.

There is no attempt to give any account of the nervous system or of the sense organs. There are the usual chapters on instinct and emotion, mental conflict, attention and interest, memory, and thinking and reasoning. Imitation, routine, and play are dealt with in a chapter entitled "Broad

Features of Human Behaviour ". The acquisition of skill and the growth of consciousness of self are, somewhat incongruously it would seem, grouped together in a chapter called " Products of Development ". A chapter on the measurement of the mind deals effectively, though cursorily, with the testing movement in psychology. A rather unconvincing chapter is devoted to the type in education, while the last chapter entitled " The Psychology of the Group ", appealed to the reviewer as perhaps the best in the book.

On the whole the book can be confidently recommended as a thorough piece of work. Though the main ideas are admittedly borrowed, they are successfully integrated and carefully explained. It is unsafe to make judgments as to the attractiveness of a book for students without trying it with a class. One is, however, inclined to think that the book under review might prove somewhat too severe an introduction to a subject met for the first time. It would, however, be well worthy of trial.

K. S. CUNNINGHAM.

INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Three Lectures by A. H. Martin, M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer in Psychology, University of Sydney, Hon. Director, Institute of Industrial Psychology, Sydney. Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology, 26 O'Connell Street, Sydney. 1931. Price: 2s.

In 1917, and during the War, occurred the Railway Strike in New South Wales. That strike was the result of the introduction into the railway workshops of the Taylor system which the men regarded as an attempt to speed them up. Taylor was the first efficiency engineer. By a careful study of the motions of men at work he was able to find the most economical set of movements necessary and thereby increase the output of the worker to a remarkable degree. Another and later worker was Gilbreth, who made slow-motion studies of the movements of workers, and from these studies made an analysis which provided the most economical and rhythmic set of movements for the task concerned. Here we have the beginnings of the application of science to work until it has now become an attempt to provide completely for the human factor in industry. It is, of course, quite erroneous to regard this attempt as one prompted by the desire to get more out of men for the benefit of employers. The aim is to benefit everybody, as is indeed possible. Above all does it hope to improve the conditions of the worker, especially to reduce the fatigue consequent upon his work.

In England this task of applying science to industry was undertaken by the Industrial Fatigue Research Board, established by the Government in 1918. In 1921, owing to the energy of Dr. C. S. Myers, of Cambridge, and thanks to the financial support initially obtained from various firms and private individuals and to a yearly grant of £1,000 for five years from the Trustees of the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, there was established in London the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. The Institute has been thoroughly successful. The grant of £1,000 a year for five years was renewed for another five years. In addition a special grant of £6,000 was made by the Carnegie Trust expressly to assist the Institute in a comprehensive scheme of research to demonstrate the value of scientifically conducted vocational guidance. The results of that prolonged and careful investigation have just appeared in book form under the title of " Methods of Choosing a Career".

The work of the London Institute led to the establishment of similar undertakings in America and in Europe. In Sydney in 1927, through the initiative of Dr. Martin, was established the Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology. It is from Dr. Martin as Honorary Director of the Institute that these three lectures issue.

The first lecture is concerned with Vocational Psychology, the second with Psychology in Industry, the third with Sales and Advertising. The lectures were given to heads of firms and men in executive positions to bring them into touch with the important recent developments in Industrial

Psychology. This kind of publicity is necessary, since business men in Australia are far removed from the countries where the value of psychology to industry is already recognized. The material of the lectures is systematically presented and suitably illustrated with graphs, diagrams and slides. After hearing them the audience must have realized that here was something of advantage to industry. If that was so, they will be gratified to know that the lectures have been put into permanent form and are to be obtained at a very low price.

In the lecture on Vocational Psychology, Dr. Martin introduces the fact of the differences which exist in the inborn traits and aptitudes of individuals, and, after clearly revealing the failure of the pseudo-sciences phrenology, physiognomy, astrology, graphology, and palmistry to determine these natural traits and aptitudes, goes on to explain the methods used by the science of psychology for measuring the degree in which any individual possesses them. These natural traits and aptitudes express themselves in the behaviour of the individual, and samples of behaviour are taken and treated in accordance with statistical principles. The result is not a subjective estimate of the psychologist, but the objective outcome of scientific measurement. The chief types of aptitude measured are:

(*a*) General Intelligence.
(*b*) Social Capacity.
(*c*) Clerical Aptitudes.
(*d*) Motor Capacities.
(*e*) Sensory Capacities.

The tests used are not arbitrarily chosen by the psychologist, but are wrought from actual cases of individual capacities in various types of work.

Vocational selection implies the working out of a specific set of tests by which to measure the aptitude of fresh applicants for a particular task. Here we are concerned with the selection of employees, staff, personnel who are fitted for the work. It may safely be claimed now, as a result of this scientific selection, that no one need any longer be a blatant misfit. The waste attendant upon older methods of selection of employees is clearly illustrated by the case cited in which out of 11,988 replies to advertisements only 46% of appointments were made. Out of these appointments made 33% were kept. Out of those keeping the appointments only 4·4% were selected. Out of those selected only 0·07% made good. The saving that results from vocational selection is illustrated by references to an English chocolate factory in which 40% of misfits was reduced to 4%, and to the Paris Transport Company which spent £10,000 upon developing, standardizing and applying selection tests for drivers and saved £70,000 by the outlay.

The second lecture deals with Applications to Industry. The topics treated are numerous including: arrangement of machinery and material in relation to sequence of processes; reduction or elimination of fatigue; seating accommodation, lighting and ventilation; speed and accessibility of machines; distractions; time and motion studies; rhythm; incentives; co-operation of the employee; welfare systems. The principles explained and the illustrations used make this a valuable lecture. The effect of fatigue upon output and upon accidents, the way to lift a brick, the best shape for handles, the value of rest pauses and much other knowledge of importance is to be found in it.

The third lecture deals with Sales and Advertising Methods. Doubtless the subject matter of this lecture was more familiar to the audience than that of the other two. Nevertheless, there was much, too, that must have been new to those present. It is unlikely, for instance, that many of them were accustomed to use any adequate scheme of market research to prevent futility and waste in advertising. The lecture, though not so technical as the other two, yet must have been readily assimilated and put to practical advantage.

In conclusion, one would strongly recommend to employers and business men generally the perusal of these three lectures which gather together so plainly for them the knowledge now available for application to commerce and industry.

H. TASMAN LOVELL.

PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS. A Series of Papers on Philosophical Topics by Different Writers. Published in two volumes by Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Regensburg, Germany.

These two volumes which run to nearly 2,000 pages in all are magnificently printed and produced as a birthday gift to the sixty-year-old Professor Joseph Geyser, of Münich. He has held chairs in Münster, Freiburg im Breisgau and Münich. von Rintelen says, in the Preface, that to his great joy more than sixty-eight savants of sixteen different states and nations were ready to share in this philosophical symposium to honour Joseph Geyser. He quotes several expressions of readiness to co-operate, like " we are indeed ready to take part in such a sympathetic work of brotherly esteem ".

The first volume is devoted to papers dealing with problems in the History of Philosophy, leading off with one in Italian by Professor Rotta, of Milan, on " a recent interpretation of ' Love ' in Plato's Symposium ". In this volume there are besides seven papers in French, including " The Presence of the Intelligible in Consciousness according to St. Thomas and Cajetan " by the distinguished Professor Noel, of Louvain, and one by Professor Sertillanges on " Some Characteristics of Christian Philosophy ". There are two in Spanish, one in English by Professor Millar, of Fordham University, New York, on " The Significance of St. Augustine's Criticism of Cicero's Definition of the State ". The rest, numbering twenty-one, are in German.

The second volume, twice the size of the first, deals with problems of philosophy under systematic headings, Logic, Criteriology, Ontology, Natural Philosophy (touching scientific problems), Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and the last section of three papers on the philosophic work of Joseph Geyser. To this volume M. C. D'Arcy, an Oxford graduate, contributes a paper in English on " Probability and Certainty," and Leslie Walker, of Oxford, one on " The Bearing of Modern Physical Theories on Catholic Philosophy ". In addition there are seven papers in French by Belgian, French, Swiss and Canadian savants, one by Étienne Gilson on the " Method of Realism ", and one on the " Notion of Time " by a Professor of Fribourg, Switzerland. There are two in Spanish, one of them on the " Morphology of the Moral Conscience ". The single Italian paper is by Professor Gemelli, of Milan, on " Emotions and Sentiments ", a research towards the construction of a theory. The remaining twenty-four papers are in German.

This monumental work is written from the standpoint of Catholic Philosophy, and incidentally shows that there is a marked activity among the professors of that school throughout the world. Subjects like The Problem of Value in Philosophy, The Rôle of Intelligence in Æsthetic Activity, Metaphysics as a Science, A Realistic Epistemology, The Problem of Intuition, Pure Phenomenology, or The Philosophy of Action, promise a veritable feast of reading on questions much in dispute at present.

It would be unfair to attempt a critical appreciation of a work of such dimensions and importance before one has had time to read carefully the papers. As far as your reviewer's reading has gone, he is convinced that this unique birthday gift to Joseph Geyser stands as an authoritative exposition of the attitude of Catholic Philosophy by the leading exponents of it in the world, and these handsome two volumes, sold by the firm of Joseph Harbel, of Regensburg (there is no mention of price), will grace any library and be a mine of useful information for philosophers generally.

W. RYAN.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS. By John Wisdom. Psyche Miniatures. London: Kegan Paul. 1931. Price: 2s. 6d.

A PHILOSOPHY IN OUTLINE. By E. S. Bennett. Psyche Miniatures. London: Kegan Paul. 1931. Price: 2s. 6d.

PERSONAL NARRATIVES. Ed. by A. J. Merson M.A. London: George G. Harrap & Co. 1931. Price: 2s.

DE LUTHER A WAGNER. By N. Klugmann and M. Dumesnil de Gramont. Paris: J. Vrin. 1931. 2 vols. Price: 40 francs.

S. AGOSTINO. Publication commemorative of the Fifteenth Anniversary of His Death. (Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica.) Milan: Catholic University of the Sacred Heart. 1931.

SCHOOL SURVEYS, 1927 AND 1929. TARANAKI EDUCATION DISTRICT, NEW ZEALAND. Arranged by N. R. McKenzie, B.A., F.R.G.S., Senior Inspector. Published by the North and South Taranaki Branches of the New Zealand Educational Institute.

METHODS OF CHOOSING A CAREER. By F. M. Earle, M.Ed., B.Sc. London: George G. Harrap & Co. 1931. Price: 12s. 6d.

JUDGING EMOTIONS FROM FACIAL EXPRESSIONS. By Leo Kanner, M.D. Psychological Review Monographs, Vol. XLI. No. 3. Princeton, N.J.

ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL HEALTH RESEARCH BOARD TO 30TH JUNE, 1931. (Medical Research Council.) London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1931. Price: 1s. 6d.

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY, SEVERANCE UNION MEDICAL COLLEGE. By Chas. I. McLaren, B.S., M.D. (Melb.), and C. C. Lee, M.B. (Sev.). Seoul, Korea. 1931.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

MIND. A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. Edited by Professor G. E. Moore. Macmillan & Co. Yearly subscription: 16s. Vol. XL. No. 158. Le Développement Intellectual chez les Jeunes Enfants: Jean Piaget. An Examination of Bosanquet's Doctrine of Self-transcendence (I): Ralph E. Stedman. The Relations of Mental and Physical Processes: A. D. Ritchie. Logical Constructions (I): John Wisdom. No. 159. Professor Stout's Theory of Possibilities, Truth, and Error: R. F. A. Hoernlé. The Work of Art and the Æsthetic Object: P. Leon. An Examination of Bosanquet's Doctrine of Self-transcendence (II): Ralph E. Stedman. The Key to Kant's Deduction of Categories: H. J. Paton.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Edited by Professors Woodbridge, Bush and Schneider, Columbia University. Published fortnightly. Annual subscription: 4 dollars.

Vol. XXVIII. No. 8. Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War: A. C. Armstrong. Immanence-Transcendence: John Wright Buckham. No. 9. The Place of Repression in Morality: Constance Rathburn. On Defining "Existence": Durant Drake. No. 10. Moral Freedom and Power: A. Myrton Frye. The Problem of Gravitation in Aristotle and the New Physics: P. M. Kretschmann. No. 11. Logical Positivism: A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl. How a Logic of "Propositions" Fails of Complete Generality: Henry Bradford Smith. No. 12. George Herbert Mead: John Dewey. Mr. Lewis's Theory of Meaning: George Boas. No. 13. Psychology and Scientific Method: Paul Horst. Are We Machines;

And What of It?: W. H. Roberts. No. 14. A Critical Discussion of Mind and the World-Order: Alice Ambrose. No. 15. The Dualism of Means and Value: Thomas T. Lafferty.

PHILOSOPHY. Journal of the British Institute of Philosophical Studies. Published quarterly. Macmillan & Co. Yearly subscription: 14s.

Vol VI. No. 23. July, 1931. *Subjective Aim* in Professor Whitehead's Philosophy: C. Lloyd Morgan. Is Moral Progress a Reality?: G. C. Field. Cosmic Purpose: J. W. Harvey. McTaggart's Contribution to the Philosophy of Religion: R. L. Patterson. Philosophy as Criticism and Point of View: Adrian Coates. An Outline of Genetic Psychology: R. F. Rattray.

PSYCHE. Edited by C. K. Ogden. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Published quarterly. Price: 5s.

No. 44. April, 1931. A Provisional Dictionary: Editorial. The Function of an International Auxiliary Language: Edward Sapir. Debabelization—A Reply to Professor Sapir: C. K. Ogden. The Biological Analysis of Sensation: Lancelot Hogben. A Psychologist's Utopia: A. Money Kyrle. Physics and the Laws of Thought: O. L. Reiser. No. 45. July, 1931. A Framework for Psychology: C. Daly King. Some Points of Disagreement with Freudian Practice and Theory: Hilda Weber. The Emotional Value of Dress: J. C. Flugel. Evolution, Consciousness, and Electricity: Oliver L. Reiser. The Strict Implication of Mr. Lewis, and the Particular Proposition in Logic: Eugene Shen.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Edited by Ed. Claparède. Geneva. Annual subscription: 16 francs.

Vol. XXII. No. 88. La Théorie des Facteurs: C. Spearman. A Propos de la Théorie des Facteurs: Richard Meili. L'Emotion "Pure": Ed. Claparède. Nouvelles Expériences sur l'Orientation des Tapinoma par par Sécrétions Dromographiques: F. Santschi. La Conception du Mal chez les Païens Bamoums: Charles Frey.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Official Organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. Baillière, Tindall & Cox. Price: 30s. per annum.

Vol. XII. Part 2. The Synthetic Function of the Ego: H. Nunberg. The Pregenital Antecedents of the Œdipus Complex: Otto Fenichel. Some Unconscious Factors in the Sonnet as a Poetic Form: Clarissa Rinaker. The Working of an Unconscious Wish in the Creation of Poetry and Drama: Rangin Haldar. A Contribution to the Theory of Intellectual Inhibition: Melanie Klein. Character Formation and the Phobias of Childhood: Wilhelm Reich.

JOURNAL OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY. Ed. by Carl Murchison. Clark University Press. Published quarterly. Annual subscription: 7 dollars.

Vol. V. No. 2. The Conflict between Aristotelian and Galileian Modes of Thought in Contemporary Psychology: Kurt Lewin. Thresholds of Illumination for the Visual Discrimination of Movement and for the Discrimination of Discreteness: Clarence H. Graham and Walter S. Hunter. Brightness Contrast and Heymans' Law: F. A. Geldard. Learning as a Property of Physical Systems: N. Rashevsky. Short Articles and Notes.

JOURNAL OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY. Ed. by Carl Murchison. Clark University Press. Published quarterly. Annual subscription: 7 dollars.

Vol. XXXIX. No. 1. The Equivalence of Stimuli in the Behaviour of Monkeys: Heinrich Kluver. The Relative Efficiency of Distributed and Massed Practice in Maze Learning by Young and Adult Albino Rats: Barbara Anne Mayer and Calvin P. Stone. The Double Alternation Problem —(I) The Behaviour of Monkeys in a Double Alternation Temporal Maze: Louis W. Gellermann. The Relative Efficacy of Form and Background in a Child's Discrimination of Visual Patterns: Norman L. Munn and

Beryl Rae Stiening. Mental and Physical Measurements of a Set of Twelve-year-old Quadruplets: Shirley L. Brintle.

ARCHIVIO GENERALE DI NEUROLOGIA, PSICHIATRIA E PSICOANALISI. Official Organ of the Italian Psycho-Analytic Society. Published quarterly. Annual subscription: 8 dollars.

Vol. XII. No. 1. Un piccolo record di lavoro neuro-psichiatrico: M. Levi Bianchini. Ciò che mi separa da Freud: W. Stekel. Forma e connessioni grigie dell'antimuro umano: Giuseppe Pintus. Sopra un raro caso di litofagia in donna alienata: Francesco Tassoni. Educazione e psicologia individualistica in rapporto ad alcuni tipi di bambini difficili: M. Levi Bianchini. Ulteriori osservazioni sul comportamento della geno-cuti-reazione nei giovani: Paolo Jedlowski. Alcoolismo e proibizionismo nella psicopatologia sociale: M. Levi Bianchini. Considerazioni sopra un caso di tumore della fossa cranica anteriore in frenastenica cerebropatica acromegalica con integrita dell'ipofisi: Carmelo Ventra.

THE ECONOMIC RECORD. Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne University Press. Price: 5s.

Vol. VII. No. 12. Australian Monetary Policy: K. S. Isles. The Depression in New Zealand: G. Lawn. Australian Capital Imports, 1871–1930: Roland Wilson. The Terms of Trade: C. V. Janes. The Railway Situation in New Zealand: E. P. Neale. The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1930: George Anderson.

JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Aldwych House, London, W.C. 2. Published quarterly. Annual subscription: 20s.

Vol. V. No. 6. Annual Report. Industrial Psychology applied to the Blind: C. B. Fox. No. 7. Some Industrial Problems of Today: Seebohm Rowntree. From School to Work: Lord Eustace Percy. The Selection of Engineering Apprentices: E. P. Allen.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW. Washington Square East, New York City. Annual subscription: 4 dollars.

Vol. VIII. No. 3. European Legislation and Judicial Decisions in the Field of Copyright in 1930; Willy Hoffman. Langdell, Gray, Thayer and Ames—Their Contribution to the Study and Teaching of Law: Joseph H. Beale. A Study of the Organization of Litigation and of the Jury Trial in the Supreme Court of New York City: William M. Wherry. The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts: Harry Baum and Leon Pressman. No. 4. June, 1931. Remarks on the Revised Austrian Civil Code: Marcel de Gallaix. The Problem of *Stare Decisis* in our Constitutional Theory: Louis B. Boudin. A Study of the Organization of Litigation and of the Jury Trial in the Supreme Court of New York: William M. Wherry.

ARCHIVOS BRASILEIROS DE HYGIENE MENTAL. Official Organ of the Brazilian League of Mental Hygiene. Praça Floriano No. 7, Rio de Janeiro. Published monthly. Price: 20s. per annum.

Vol. IV. No. 2. A campanha da eugenia no Brasil: Renato Kehl. Subsidio para a adaptação brasileira dos tests de Binet-Terman: Ernani Lopes.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Journal of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu. Price: 25 cents.

Vol. IV. No. 5. Subsidies in Japan: Herbert M. Bratter. The Chinese Actress: George Kin Leung. Pacific Events of the Month: The Editor. Modern Books on Japan: No. 6. Politics in the Japan Diet: Tamon Maeda. Science East and West: H. C. Zen. Japan-China Economic Relations: Roy H. Akagi. No. 7. New Zealand: H. F. von Haast. Pacific Dependencies—A Syllabus. Feetham Report on Shanghai: A Digest. No. 8. Social Changes in China: L. K. Tao. Britain and the Pacific: Stephen A. Heald. Japan's "Dangerous" Students: E. H. Anstice. Aliens in New Zealand: T. D. H. Hall.

BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT NATIONAL D'ORIENTATION PROFESSIONNELLE. Monthly Review. Musée Pédagogique, 41, Rue Gay Lussac, Paris. Price: 25 francs per annum.

THE MORPETH REVIEW. The S. John's College Press, Morpeth. Published quarterly. Annual subscription: 7s. 6d.

Vol. II. No. 16. Life or Death: E. H. Burgmann. Religion in Society: A. P. Elkin. Secularism: Kenneth Henderson. Imperialism: F. L. Wood. The Gold Standard: R. B. Madgwick. South African Novel: Alfred Stirling. Art in the Middle Ages: L. G. H. Huxley. Australian Journalism: Farmer Whyte. Gospel Foundations: P. A. Micklem.

THE AUSTRALIAN INTERCOLLEGIAN. Published monthly by the Australian Student Christian Movement. 182 Collins Street, Melbourne.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Sydney. Australasian Medical Publishing Co., Seamer Street, Glebe. Published weekly. Price: 1s.

NOTES AND NEWS.

ANNOUNCEMENT.

A PRIZE COMPETITION OF 10,000 FRANCS IS OFFERED FOR THE BEST WORLD TREATISE ON "TOTAL EDUCATION" (PHYSICAL, INTELLECTUAL, MORAL).

This competition, under the patronage of "The New Education Fellowship", will be closed on December 31, 1931.

The Manuscripts shall be in English or French, written or translated.

The total education of a human being is the way his germinal heredity is gradually developed, in and by his entire "universal" environment. The object of this competition, placed under the patronage of "The New Education Fellowship", is to show:

(*a*) That it is in the interest of every one that this heredity should be the best possible, and developed as much as possible in each one.

(*b*) That each individual so educated can train himself and others, with a view to world-wide propagation of this education.

(*c*) The urgent necessity of an understanding amongst educationists, possible in the light of a universal point of view.

For particulars apply to:

"Groupe Français d'Education Nouvelle, 41, Rue Gay-Lussac, Paris V^e^."

* * * * * *

The Editor has received the following communication from the General Secretary of "Scientia", Milan, via A. De Togni, 12.

DEAR SIR,

The Review "Scientia", in agreement with the family of its late illustrious Director, Eugenio Rignano, who died in Milan on February 9th, 1930, has founded a "Rignano Prize", of the value of 10,000 Lire, to be awarded by competition, in accordance with the terms of the enclosed announcement, to an author of a study on:

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NOTION OF TIME.

The last day for submitting works competing for the Prize is December 31st, 1932.

The Review believes that, in taking this step, it is paying the best tribute to the memory of its late Director, giving an impulse to the scientific and philosophical studies to which he dedicated his life, and, at the same time, furthering the union and spiritual emulation of the scientists of all the countries, which was his highest aspiration.

The Directorate of the Review, in bringing this competition to your notice, invites you to participate in it, and also to give, from your Chair and otherwise, the greatest possible publicity to this announcement.

This competition is promulgated by the most important and widely diffused international scientific review. The theme set is of great importance, and of particular interest at the present moment. The Review will give world-wide publicity not only to the name of the prize winner, but also to those of the other competitors most deserving of praise, by reviewing their works. All these facts will, we trust, attract to this competition the sympathy, not only of those who are acquainted with the work of Rignano or with "Scientia", but also of all students of the important problems of scientific philosophy.

The competition is completely international and open to all. Anyone can take part in it, without regard to school, tendency, or faculty.

The Editor of "Scientia" will, on request, give any further information desired.

We should be very grateful to you if you would co-operate with us to make the competition a success: both, as we have said, by taking part in it, and by making it known to your colleagues and pupils who may be interested, and eventually, by yourself suggesting the best means of giving full notice of the competition in your city, in the scientific societies of which you are a member, and in the study circles which you take part in.

Yours faithfully,

For the Review "Scientia",

DR. PAOLO BONETTI,

General Secretary.

* * * * * *

THE HEGEL CONGRESS.

Invitations have been issued by the Berlin Committee of the International Hegel Association to a Hegel Congress to be held in Berlin in October next. On November 14th falls the centenary of Hegel's death which occurred in Berlin. The Hegel Association was founded last year at the Hague. This Association has joined with the Professors of Philosophy of the University of Berlin and other Berlin personalities in order to celebrate worthily and in the place of Hegel's last and most intense activity the centenary of his death. The programme is as follows:

1. Sunday- October 18th, 1931. Reception.
2. Monday, October 19th (morning). Opening Session.
3. From Monday, 19th, to Wednesday, 21st, will be given addresses covering the whole field of Hegel's philosophy.

The following are among the addresses arranged:

Baillie (Leeds): The Importance of the Phenomenology of the Spirit.
Hessing (Bennekom): The Nature of the Dialectic.
Calogero (Rome): The Problem of Hegelian Logic.
Wigersma (Haarlem): The Hegelian Philosophy of Nature.
Baer (Halle): Hegel and Mathematics.
Ischiżewski (Zähringen): Hegel and the Philosophy of Language.
Larenz (Göttingen): Hegel and Private Right.
Glockner (Heidelberg): Æsthetics in Hegel's System of Philosophy.
Wolff (Hamburg): Hegel and Shakespeare.
Lasson (Berlin): Hegel's Philosophy of Religion.
Stenzel (Kiel): Hegel's Conception of Greek Philosophy.
Kroner (Kiel): Hegel and the Present.